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ABSTRACT 
The solvency test has been widely lauded as providing a material 
improvement to the position of creditors. The principle aim of the 
paper is to examine whether this is true. 
The paper seeks to examine not only the effect of the test on 
classical distribution transactions but on distributions as a whole. 
Examples of some of the common methods of distribution are 
analysed to see whether the changes in the form of the statute 
affect the ability to make these distributions. The conclusion 
reached is that the 1993 Act actually allows a wider range of 
distributions than the 1955 Act. 
The paper then analyses whether the position reached is desirable 
by examining the economic theory of the company and by 
examining alternative options the law could have adopted. In the 
course of this analysis it is concluded that the solvency test is 
redundant in the scheme of the Act and that the general directors 
duties provide as much protection as is required. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 20,000 
words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
A A Desire to Distribute Wealth From a Company 
A legal fiction makes the company a person with many of 
the same rights and powers as real persons. This legal 
fiction has been justified on the basis it provides an " ... 
[efficient] and [flexible] system for organising aggregation 
and use of capital." 1 In the classical model the company 1s 
used as a means of combining resources contributed by 
various individuals under the control of a management 
team. The contributors receive an entitlement to some 
share in the net wealth of the company and are thus called 
shareholders. 
Historically such companies were formed for individual 
speculative ventures with a limited life. 2 At the conclusion 
of the venture any debts of the company were paid and 
the surplus was returned to the shareholders. Increasingly 
however companies were created for ventures of 
indefinite duration. The indefinite life of the company 
created a desire3 for means of distributing wealth to 
shareholders while the company was still in operation, and 
thus had debts. Several mechanisms for doing so were 
soon developed. 
While the ability to distribute wealth to shareholders may 
be desirable to shareholders it also creates a risk of abuse. 
The challenge for the legal system is to provide 
New Zealand Law Commission Company law Reform and Restatement -
Report No. 9 (Wellington 1989), 2. For a more detailed discussion .)f the 
economic basis of the limited liability company see part 5 below. 
A traditional example is the formation of a company to fit out a 3hip 
for a voyage of privateering or trade. If the ship returned from the 
voyage the profits from the voyage would be returned to the 
shareholders. 
The economic basis of this desire is examined in detail in Kumert "State 
Statutory Restrictions on Financial Distributions by Corporations to 
Shareholder (Part I)" 59 Wash. L. Rev 359, 365-379. Obtained from Cary 
and Eisenberg Cases and Materials on Corporations , 1368 
2 
distribution rules 4 that balance the cost of abuse against 
any costs associated with those rules. This paper examines 
the response of the Companies Act 1993 ("the Act") to 
those challenges. 
In particular this paper will examine the extent to which 
the Act substantively changes the law from that which 
existed under the Companies Act 19555 ("the 1955 Act") 
and whether the result under the Act is desirable. The first 
of these issues will be examined by identifying the 
possible types of distribution, outlining the general scheme 
of each of the Acts and then analysing the implications of 
each Act on particular distribution transactions. The 
practical significance of any resulting differences will be 
evaluated. The second issue will be analysed from a more 
theoretical perspective. 
4 These distribution rules are often called capital maintenance rules . 
However this paper will use that term only when referring to rules 
which do if fact require the maintenance of some level of capital. Such 
rules are a subset of the possible distribution rules . 
5 In this paper references to the 1955 Act are to that Act before its 
amendment in 1993 by various Acts associated with the Companies Act 
1993. Readers should therefore be aware that the numbers and or 
content of some sections referred to in this paper changed on 1 July 
1994 . 
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B Methods of Wealth Distribution 
The focus of many commentators has been on the classical 
forms of distributing wealth from the company to its 
shareholders. These are: 
( 1) payment of dividends; 
( 2) returns of capital; and 
( 3) repurchase of shares. 
All three devices are suited to providing a form of passive 
income6 and are the most convenient means of providing 
shareholders with a return where there is a significant 
separation of ownership and management of the 
enterprise. However the majority7 of companies in 
existence today are closely held companies. 8 . The closely 
held company is commonly used as a device for running a 
partnership, family enterprise or even a sole trader 
operation. In these situations the company form is used 
because of the availability of limited liability9 and possibly 
the availability of the floating charge security 
mechanism. 1 O 
6 Passive income is income earned from assets owned with little or no 
personal effort required. Stable holdings of listed equities are a classic 
example. 
7 It is estimated that over 95% of all companies in New Zealand are 
private companies and thus have fewer than twenty shareholders. A.J. 
Robb, K.J. Leo and J.R. Haggett Company Accounting in New Zealand 
(John Wiley & Sons, 1987), 4. 
8 A closely held company is one with a small number of shareholders. It 
is typified by little separation of ownership and management with at 
least one of the shareholders involved in the day to day business of the 
company. 
9 In a public company limited liability acts to limit potential losses to the 
amount of the initial investment. In closely held companies the goal is 
often to avoid any potential losses. A more detailed discussion of the 
benefits of limited liability is at part IV. 
1 0 The floating charge is a legal mechanism by which a creditor can 
secure the debts owed to it by the company by creating a legal right 
over all property of the company not otherwise used as security. This 
mechanism is only available through use of the company form. Its 
major advantage over chattel mortgages is in transaction costs where 
similar assets (eg trading stock, debtors) are repeatedly consumed/sold 
and replaced. Company Accounting in New Zealand, above n 7, 3 
suggests that given the frequency with which limited liability is by 
4 
In a closely held company the shareholders are usually 
also employee/directors. The return sought by 
shareholders in such companies is often employment and 
fringe benefits such as cheap goods, motor vehicles or even 
accommodation rather than a passive income stream and 
capital gains. As a principal purpose is to avoid exposing 
assets to liability only nominal capital is contributed. The 
fixed assets needed for the running of the business can be 
owned by the shareholders and leased to the company. 
Any remaining working capital requirements can be met 
by lending funds to the company and securing these funds 
by use of a floating charge. Lower tax rates available to the 
shareholders 11 and the relative lack of formalities 
involved have all encouraged closely held companies' 
owners to extract wealth 12 from the company in the form 
of: 
(1) salary; 
(2) fringe benefits; and 
(3) rentals 
rather than by the classical forms. 
Another form of distribution of wealth is the use of assets 
owned by the company to either provide loans to 
shareholders or related parties or to provide guarantees of 
loans to such parties. Loans and guarantees are 
particularly common in groups of companies where assets 
present m one subsidiary are used to fund operations of 
passed by the g1vmg of personal guarantees to creditors the 
availability of the floating charge may be the more significant reason 
for forming a company . 
11 Historically dividends from tax paid income of the company have been 
taxed as income in the hands of the shareholders, creating a double tax 
levy on company profits. Recent amendments to the Income Tax Act 
1976 such as the imputation regime and the qualifying company 
regime have reduced these tax driven incentives but the old habits 
remain. 
12 Inherent difficulties in valuation of the services and goods provided 
by the shareholder/employees make it difficult to identify whether an 
exchange of value or a distribution of wealth is occurring 
1 3 
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another or of the parent. This type of distribution of 
wealth is different to the other types because, prima facie, 
it does not affect the wealth of the company. The 
transaction appears to be a swap of one asset ("Loan to 
shareholder") for another. 1 3 
The company's wealth may be affected by such a loan if 
there is a possibility of default and the assets of the 
shareholder, other than the company shares, are less than 
the amount of the loan. 14 In this situation the value of the 
company's asset "Loan to shareholder" is partly 
represented by its own shares. 15 Netting off this share m 
itself will reduce the equity of the company. 
Given most companies are closely held and such companies 
distribute wealth as part of payments for goods and 
services the continued focus of most writers on the 
classical forms of distribution or on financial assistance 
may seem odd. There are several possible explanations for 
this continued focus: 
( 1) the higher public profile of widely held companies; 
( 2) the involvement of professional analysts in studying 
issues relating to widely held companies; 
( 3) a general academic tendency to examine theory m 
preference to reality; 
( 4) the existence of less litigation on bundled 
distributions rather than classical distributions; and/or 
If the loan is not at an interest rate appropriate to the risk level a real 
transfer of wealth from the company to the shareholder will occur 
over time . 
This may arise if the loan or guarantee is used to fund the purchase of 
shares in the company or if the loan is used to fund personal 
consumption rather than the purchase of other assets. The loan 
effectively makes the shareholder personally laible and makes the 
situation similar to that of a sole proprietor who is insolvent. 
Where there is a prospect of default the assets available to the lender 
become economically significant. If the non-share personal wealth of 
the shareholder is less than the loan those shares will be part of the 
assets available to satisfy the debt to the company. 
6 
( 5) the bundled distribution 1s dealt with by areas of 
law other than the law of distributions, reducing the need 
for it to be explicitly examined. 
This paper will to some extent indicate which of these 
possibilities explain the current focus. 
16 
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I I COMPARISON OF THE 1993 AND 1955 ACTS 
A Sratutorv Scheme of 1955 Act 
The 1955 Act regulated distributions through several 
mechanisms. First it had a set of capital maintenance rules 
to deal with the classical methods of distributing wealth. 
Secondly it barred the provision of financial assistance for 
purchase of own shares. Thirdly the 1955 Act created 
remedies for recovery by the liquidator of losses suffered 
by the company in any transactions at under- or over-
value. Finally several general provisions which created 
liability for directors where there was fraud or negligence 
had an impact on distributions. 
The capital maintenance regime under the 1955 Act 
comprised a combination of a few statutory rules and a 
more extensive common law regime. The statute provided 
detailed distinctions 16 between contributed capital, 
including share premiums, and retained earnings. 
Distributions were allowed only from the latter.17 The 
1955 Act set out a detailed procedure for the reduction of 
capital involving High Court approval. 18 Common law rules 
These distinctions can be distilled from a number of provisions rn Part 
III of the 1955 Act. 
The 1955 Act did not explicitly state that dividends could only be paid 
from profits, perhaps because the common law had already reached 
this result. The 1955 Act does appear to implicitly adopt the common 
law rules. For example the capital reduction regime would be 
superfluous if capital could be distributed. An even more direct 
indication is contained in the model Articles of Association contained 
in Table A. Section 22 provides that a company may adopt any or all of 
the Table A articles. Article 114 to 116 deal with the declaration of 
dividends and Article 116 states "No dividends shall be paid otherwise 
than out of dividends". Article 116 shows the 1955 Act envisages this 
principal but does not an explicit requirement as the Articles are 
effectively only the terms of a contract between the shareholders. The 
only explicit limit on the ability of shareholders to change the terms 
of that contract is section 24 which states the company may change its 
Articles "subject to the provisions of this Act" . Article 116 is a 
therefore a mandatory rule only to the extent the Act and the common 
law do not allow it to be changed. The common law is thus the primary 
source of this principle. This is reflected in the cases which generally 
do not rely on the statutory provisions as the basis of their decisions. 
Sections 75 to 80. 
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predating the 1955 Act prohibited repurchase of own 
shares. 19 
Section 62 provided a penalty of $200 for companies and 
their directors and officers where the company provided 
financial assistance for purchase of its own shares.20 
Statutory exceptions to the financial assistance rules for 
employees provided significant scope for avoidance of 
these rules. Loans and guarantees of loans to directors 
were barred by the 1955 Act. 21 There was no specific 
provision barring loans to shareholders for purposes other 
than the purchase of the company's own shares. 
Statutory provisions allowed the avoidance by the 
liquidator of preferences and securities given when the 
company was unable to pay its debts22 and of transactions 
involving inadequate or excessive consideration.23 These 
provisions potentially allowed recovery from shareholders 
where excessive salaries, rents or fringe benefits had been 
provided. 
The general duties contained in the 1955 Act had 
significant potential to allow recovery of distributions from 
directors. For example the failure to keep adequate 
accounting records could make an officer of the company 
personally liable to repay any resulting loss.24 This 
provision could be relevant to where dividends were paid 
19 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 is the traditional source of 
this rule in commonwealth jurisdictions. 
20 The section's major penalty in practice was the illegality of the 
transaction and the liability this potentially created for directors 
under the other provisions of the 1955 Act or under the tort of 
conspiracy. See for example Belmont Finance Corporation v Williams 
Furniture Ltd [ 1980] 1 All ER, 396. 
21 Section 190. 
22 Sections 309 to 311 B allow avoidance of preferences given within the 2 
years prior to windi.1g up and avoidance of securities given within the 
12 months prior to winding up . 
23 Section 31 lC allows the liquidator to recover the excess received by the 
shareholder on transactions within the 3 years prior to winding up . 
24 Section 3 I 9. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
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because accounting records failed to show the true 
financial position of the company. 
The incurring of debts without an honest belief on 
reasonable grounds that they could be repaid when due 
also made an officer potentially liable for the resulting 
lo .25 Any person who was guilty of any negligence, 
breach of trust or duty in relation to the company could be 
compelled to compensate the company _26 Any distribution 
which made the company insolvent could be a breach of 
these provisions allowing recovery from the directors. 
B Statutory Scheme of 1993 Act 
The scheme of the Act is similar to that of the 1955 Act m 
that the classical forms of distribution are explicitly 
addressed while the more common forms of wealth 
extraction are left to the general insolvency provisions. 
However the 1993 Act is different in that as well as 
dividends it also specifically allows repurchases of shares 
and the provision of financial assistance for the purchase 
of shares. The statutory scheme which distinguished 
between capital, including share premiums, and retained 
earnings is abandoned.2 7 The capital maintenance regime 
now based around a requirement that the solvency test 
be met. The test is met if:2 8 
(a) the company is able to pay its debts as they become due 
in the normal course of business; and 
( b) the value of the company's assets is greater than the 
value of its liabilities including contingent liabilities. 
Section 320. This provision is often referred to as the "reckless 
trading" provision. 
Section 321. 
The removal of the capital/retained earnings disti1.ction made the 
reduction of capital provisions redundant and these were not brought 
forward. 
Section 4 of the Act contains the above definition. Subsections 4(2) to 
4(4) specify matters which must be considered when evaluating 
whether the test is met. 
I 0 
The first limb of the te t is often referred to as the 
"trading limb" and resembles the 1955 Act reckless 
trading provision. The second limb is referred to as the 
"balance sheet limb". 
When authorising a distribution29 the directors must 1gn a 
certificate stating they are of the opinion that the solvency 
test will be satisfied after the distribution and the grounds 
on which that opinion is based on that certificate. If, after 
authorising the distribution but before the distribution is 
made, the directors cease to believe the solvency test 1s 
met the distribution is deemed not to have been 
authorised.30 Distributions include: the payment of 
dividends, 31 the purchase of own shares,3 2 the redemption 
of shares at the company's option33 and the prov1s10n of 
financial assistance for the purchase of own shares.3 4 
A scheme for the sale of discounted goods to shareholders 
1s not a distribution for the purposes of the Act and no 
certificate is required. However the directors must be 
satisfied on reasonable grounds that the company satisfies 
the solvency test before approving or continuing such a 
scheme and if the company did not in fact satisfy the test 
the scheme is treated as if it were a distribution.3 5 
2 9 Defined in section 2 as " - (a) The direct or indirect transfer of money 
or property, other than the company's own shares, to or for the 
benefit of the shareholder; or (b) The incurring of a debt to or for the 
benefit of the shareholder - in relation to shares held by that 
shareholder". 
30 Section 52 of the Act. Section 52(4) specifies some factors to be taken 
into account in application of the solvency test to distributions. 
31 Section 53(1). 
3 2 Section 5 8 creates this power. There are several mechanisms by which 
the shares can be repurchased. All are subject to certification 
requirements (sections 60(5), 61(3) and 63(3)). Section 67(1) makes the 
contract of repurchase enforceable subject to satisfaction of the 
solvency test. 
3 3 Section 70. 
34 Section 77. Subsection 77(6) provides some amendments to the 
meaning of terms used in applying the solvency test. 
3 5 Section 55 . 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
1 1 
Another innovation of the Act 1s the ection 107(1) 
unanimous agreement. Such an agreement may provide a 
hortened procedure for the above types of distribution or 
for payment of remuneration to directors. The powers 
conferred under such agreements may only be exercised 
when the solvency test is met. 36 A requirement to certify 
the solvency test is met is also contained in the new 
amalgamations provisions.37 
Failure of a director who voted for the distribution to sign 
the required certificate is an offence and makes the 
director liable to a $5,000 penalty.38 This provision 
operates whether or not the test was in fact satisfied and 
is intended to provide an incentive for directors to follow 
the procedure.3 9 
The distribution can be recovered from a shareholder if 
the company did not in fact satisfy the solvency test 
immediately after the distribution. 40 The shareholder can 
be relieved of liability where the distribution was received 
in good faith and the shareholder altered its position based 
on the distribution making full recovery unfair. 
Any amounts which cannot be recovered from the 
shareholders can be recovered from a director if:41 
( 1) the certification procedure was not followed; or 
( 2) the procedure was followed but reasonable 
grounds for the opinion did not exist; or 
Section 108. 
Sections 221 and 222. 
Section 373(1). 
The Act does not mention what factors should be considered by the 
courts when deciding on the penalty to apply. Presumably a failure to 
sign the required certificate would not attract a significant penalty 
where the test was in fact met will result in only a nominal fine. 
Section 56(1). The amount recoverable is limited by Section 56(5) 
which provides that where part of the distribution would not have put 
the company in breach of the solvency test the shareholders and 
directors may be relieved of the liability to repay that part. 
Subsections 56(2) to 56(4). 
1 2 
( 3) after authorisation of the distribution but before 
it was made the director ceased to be satisfied on 
reasonable grounds that the solvency test was 
met 
and that director either 
( 1) failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the 
procedure was followed; or 
( 2) signed the certificate; or 
( 3) failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the 
distribution was not made. 
The solvency test thus provides a reasonably 
comprehensive set of principles for determining when a 
classical distribution may be made and when a distribution 
which should not have been made can be recovered from 
shareholders and directors. However the solvency test 
does not address other possible means of wealth extraction 
such as salaries, other provisions of goods and services to 
the company, loans and guarantees made by the company 
( other than for purchase of shares) and purchases of assets 
(other than as part of a discount scheme). These types of 
distribution are dealt with by a number of other 
prov1s10ns. 
Salaries and other remuneration of directors are dealt with 
by section 161. Transactions in which the directors are 
interested are dealt with in sections 139 to 141. The 
provisions in sections 292 to 296 (voidable transactions) 
and sections 297 to 301 (transactions at under- or over-
value) are all targeted at wealth removing transactions . 
The general duties of directors contained in section 1354 2 
42 The 1993 Act section heading describes this as the reckless trading 
prov1s1on even though this section is very different to the 1955 Act 
reckless trading provision while section 136 (headed "Duty in Relation 
to Obligations") is almost identical to the 1955 provision. This paper 
will refer to section 136 as the reckless trading provision and to 
section 135 as the "substantial risk of loss" provision. 
1 3 
( ubstantial risk of loss) and section 136 (reckless trading) 
may also be of relevance as they were under the 1955 Act. 
The framework of the 1993 Act thus bears many 
imilarities to the framework of the 1955 Act. The 
di tinguishing feature is that more of the rules relating to 
classical distributions are explicit in the 1993 Act. The 
extent to which these two frameworks differ is best 
examined by looking at individual transactions. 
1 4 
I I I ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE TWO ACTS ON 
SPECIFIC TRANSACTIONS 
A Approach Taken 
Given the Act introduces a statutory scheme where the 
1955 Act had relied on common law rules the question 
which arises is does it make any difference in practice. 
This question is particularly significant given the new Act 
in general and the solvency test in particular have been 
hailed by the media as a major reform with the potential 
to prevent abuse of the company form . The approach 
taken will be to analyse a range of common distribution 
transactions from two perspectives - ex ante4 3 and ex 
poste. 44 
1 Ex ante 
From the perspective of the directors the pnmary concern 
is to ensure that the distribution is lawful. In deciding 
whether a distribution should be made directors must 
consider: 
(i) what reports are required to make the distribution 
decision and should these be historical reports or 
forecasts ; 
(ii) what should be the valuation basis of these reports; 
(iii) to what extent can expert opinions be relied on : 
(iv) what external approvals are required and from whom ; 
and 
( v) what other formalities are required . 
The primary concern of the creditors is that they be 
informed of any material change in the equity of the 
company and that they are able to act to protect their 
interests. 
43 Before the transaction . 
44 After the tran saction . 
' 
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Shareholders' principal concern is whether the distribution 
they have received can be relied on as income. Where 
dividends affect the distribution of wealth between 
shareholders the shareholders will also be concerned that 
they be notified of any such distribution and have the 
power to object. 
2 Ex poste 
Where the distribution may have been unlawful there will 
generally be no problem unless the company becomes 
insolvent. 4 5 A liquidator or receiver will then be appointed 
and may use the illegality of the transaction to attempt to 
recover the distribution. 
The liquidator's principal concern will be how cost 
effective it will be to obtain judgement. Relevant factors 
will be: 
(i) on what grounds can recovery be sought; 
(ii) how easy will it be to obtain evidence to support 
an action for recovery; 
(iii) who bears the burden of proving elements of the 
action; and 
(iv) the amounts which are recoverable. 
Shareholders will be concerned as to how much of, and in 
what circumstances, past distributions can be recovered. 
This will depend on: 
(i) the availability of estoppel type defences; and 
(ii) the time bar on such recoveries. 
The directors will be concerned as to the extent to which 
amounts not recovered from the shareholders will b.: 
45 Issues may also arise where ownership of shares or control of the 
company change. This paper will focus on the instances where the 
company has become insolvent. 
l 6 
recoverable from them. The existence of civil or criminal 
penalties will also be of interest to the directors. 
3 Transactions examined 
This paper aims to examine bundled distributions as well 
as the classical forms. A number of common distribution 
transactions will be examined including: 
( 1) payment of salary; 
( 2) the provision of goods and services to the 
company; 
( 3) payment of a dividend; 
( 4) return of capital contributions; and 
( 5) the making of loans by subsidiaries to parents. 
B Payment of Salary 
In closely held companies salary payments to shareholder-
employees are the primary means of distributing company 
earnings. 46 where there are shareholder employees. The 
shareholder-employees are usually also directors. 
The example transaction which will be examined involves 
a closely held company whose shareholders are a married 
couple. W, the wife, has operated as a sole trader plumber 
for several years and has decided to use the company form 
to protect her assets. H, the husband, has helped with the 
books and taking phone calls etc. The couple therefore 
incorporate a company with a share capital of $2. The 
trade name of the sole trader operation and the customer 
list are leased to the company as are all the tools and the 
company van. Other working capital in the business is 
borrowed from the bank which uses the couple's mortgage 
as security for the loan. 
46 Payment of salary to non shareholder directors is not a distribution 
and is therefore outside the scope of this paper. 
\ 
47 
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As a sole trader W earned all the income of the busines 
directly. While H effectively gained an interest in that 
income due to his marriage to W he was also paid a wage 
for tax purposes. 4 7 Any other money the couple took out of 
the business was described as drawings. In a sole trader 
drawings are of no legal significance as they simply 
involve a change in the purpose for which a person is 
using his or her own assets. 
By contrast a company is a separate legal person. Company 
money taken out of the business as drawings will now 
legally be a loan from the company to the couple. If the 
company became insolvent the couple could be compelled 
to repay these loans. The couple therefore need to extract 
the earnings of the company if they are to achieve their 
goal of limiting their exposure to insolvency of the 
business. 
The husband and wife as directors/ shareholders/ 
employees will receive the benefits of the company's 
earnings whether these are paid as salary, directors' fees 
or dividends. However tax effects, transaction costs and 
risk issues may mean the husband and wife are not 
indifferent as to the form of the payment. 
In deciding what level of salary to pay themselves the 
couple have two principle options, a fixed salary or a 
performance based salary. A fixed salary may be based on 
standard rates of pay for the position (e.g. typical plumber 
wage) or on the expected income the business will 
produce. A performance based salary could involve either 
several steps based on the company's pre-salary profit or 
could even be set at the company's pre-salary profit. Only 
the last of these options is certain to remove all profits as 
salary. 
Most jurisdictions provide for marginal tax rates so that splitting 
income between family members reduces the tax paid on the income of 
the household . 
I 8 
Tax may48 affect the net economic wealth of the couple if 
the company profit does not equal the salaries paid. If the 
pre-salary profit is lower than the salaries then the 
shareholder will show income and be taxed on it while the 
company will show a loss due to the payment of the alary. 
Our tax system does not provide refunds for losses, 
although losses can be carried forward. The result is that 
the couple pay tax now and bear the cost losing the use of 
those funds until the company posts taxable profits. If the 
company does better than the fixed salaries the 
opportunity to use the lower marginal tax rates of the 
couple may be lost.4 9 
Transaction costs favour paymg out all of the wealth of the 
company as salary. If pre-salary profit exceeds the salaries 
the wealth which builds up in the company must be 
distributed as by other means. As will be seen m 
following examples this will involve additional formalities 
and create risks of liability. If pre-salary profit is less than 
the salaries the couple may have to wind the company up 
to avoid later liability for trading while insolvent as the 
company has no capital to act as a buffer to gains or losses. 
The risk element involves competing desires. Where 
earnings are left in the company the couple's goal of 
reducing or eliminating their exposure to insolvency of the 
business is compromised. On the other hand a fixed salary 
will ensure the couple still receive compensation for their 
labour.SO Ex ante the decision for the directors based on 
the risk element will thus depend on their assessment of 
the probability of the company doing badly. 
48 "May" is used because the qualifying company regime can eliminate 
these tax effects. However the company must elect to enter this 
regime. 
49 Companies in New Zealand pay tax at a flat rate of 33% while 
individuals pay this rate only on income over $30,875. 
50 In practice the company may not have sufficient funds to pay the 
salary. The couple will then get a preference in liquidation to the 
extent of S6,000 each and be unsecured creditors for the remainder. 
Attempts to extract unpaid shareholder salaries clo e to liquidation are 
a common source of voidable preference actions . 
\ 
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In our example the couple consider that the business is 
likely to do well and therefore select a performance based 
salary equal to the profits of the company less $10. To the 
extent the business grows and requires more resources 
the e can be either loaned or leased back to the company. 
Now the couple have made their decision they must 
consider the steps which must be followed. 
1 Ex ante 
Neither the 1955 Act nor the 1993 Act give any direction 
as to the factors directors must consider when deciding on 
employee-director salaries. The general duty to act in the 
best interests of the company applies. Whether a 
particular level of salary is in the best interests of the 
company will be a question of fact. 
Setting the salary level equal to the earmngs of the 
company appears fair to the company. First all the 
earnings of the company are attributable to the efforts of 
the couple. The company has nominal assets so any return 
it makes on those assets is a good one. The $10 the couple 
intend to leave in the company would represent a 500% 
return on capital in the first year. The company is gaining 
the services of the couple on a bonus system which places 
most of the business risk on the couple. By working for 
such a small company the couple expose themselves to a 
high risk of redundancy while also reducing the chances 
that there will be any assets available to pay redundancy 
pay. All these factors suggest it is fair for the couple to 
receive most of the company's earnings. 
If the couple wished to protect themselves more 
thoroughly then an expert opinion could be gained as to 
what constitutes a fair salary. However such an opinion 
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would appear unnecessary given the facts.5 1 Courts are 
generally reluctant to interfere in decisions as to the 
adequacy of consideration or indeed in directors' decisions 
generally. 
Neither Act requires the directors to inform any party or 
to gain any approvals for such salaries. There are some 
formalities to be considered however. 
Under the 1955 Act few formalities are required. The 
couple draft up a simple contract and sign it as employees 
and as directors. The couple could formally notify 
themselves of their interest in the contract in the minute 
book52 but this does not appear to be necessary.53 
Under the 1993 Act the formalities contained in section 
161 must be followed. 54 The directors must sign a 
certificate stating that in their opinion the contract 1s fair 
to the company. The certificate must state the basis of the 
director's opinion. A short paragraph to the effect the 
couple bear most of the risk and therefore most of the 
5 1 Expert opinion would be more valuable where the salary was fixed. See 
discussion of the value of expert opinion below n 124. 
5 2 This procedure is set out for self interested transactions in section 199. 
The 1955 Act does not make explicitly state that a contract of 
remuneration does not fall within the interested transaction regime 
but the scheme suggests it does not. Section 143 of the 1993 Act 
explicitly separates the two regimes. 
5 3 Section 196 is the only section dealing directly with director's 
remuneration. The section provides a mechanism by which 
shareholders can request a statement of director's earnings. There is 
no reference to a need to follow the self interested transaction 
procedure. 
5 4 The directors could use the procedure in section 107(1) to contract out 
of the requirement to follow the section 161 process. In the current 
example the section 107(1) procedure would be undesirable as it 
requires certification by the directors that the solvency test is met. 
Further the directors would need to consider whether the solvency test 
was met before each payment. As shown in the classic distribution 
examples the solvency test entails considerably more inconvenience 
and risk for the directors th.1n the section 161 procedure. The section 
107(1) provision appears to b~ aimed at situations where other 
shareholders might later claim the payment was unfair rather than at 
this type of transaction. Even in such situations a side agreement 
between the shareholders not to exercise their rights under section 
I 61 would be a more effective device than a section I 07(1) agreement. 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
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rewards would suffice. The directors must also enter the 
particulars of the contract in the interests register. The 
contract could be a long term one in which case no further 
certificates or intere t register entries would be 
required .55 
The creditors have no statutory right of notification. Under 
the 1955 Act only shareholders can request information on 
the director's remuneration. Under the 1993 Act the 
interests register is available for inspection only by 
shareholders .56 The 1993 Act requires the Annual Report 
to show the remuneration of the directors57 but this 
document is agam only available to shareholders. 
Creditors are free to contract to obtain this information 
and even to regulate the employment contract. In practice 
trade creditors and involuntary creditors58 will not 
contract to obtain such information as the costs of 
obtaining such information will exceed the benefits. The 
bank is secured by the mortgage and thus can avoid the 
costs associated with obtaining such information. Other 
major creditors would probably avoid the informational 
costs by obtaining a personal guarantee. With a personal 
guarantee the creditors will be largely indifferent as to 
whether the company or the shareholders have the 
wealth.59 
The employment contract could provide for an indefinite obligation to 
provide employment being put on the company with the couple being 
able to resign on giving a months notice. This will allow the couple to 
sell their services elsewhere if the company becomes unprofitable. 
Section 216. 
Section 211 . 
The term "involuntary creditors" is used to describe persons who 
either have not contracted with the company (ie. peopb , with tortious 
claims on the company) or persons who were in a contract with the 
company but became a creditor due to a failure to perform the contract 
(eg a customer whose house was damaged by W's negligence). 
These creditors will be more concerned with the real economic wealth 
of the couple than whether those earnings are held in the company. 
In practice transaction costs will probably mean the major creditors 
will not even bother to obtain information on this point. Instead they 
are likely to rely on the couple's interest in avoiding personal 
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As the couple are the only directors and shareholders they 
have no interest in their rights as shareholders . 
2 Ex paste 
Suppose the plumbing business operated profitably for 
five years . In that time there were significant payouts to 
the couple. Then the company had a disastrous year. 
Competition in the industry reduced profit margins. A 
contract was taken on with a margin so tight that when 
events went against the company it was unable to met its 
obligations. The other party to the contract is entitled to 
significant damages for non performance. The company 
has only net assets equal to the $2 initial capital and the 
$10 r~tained each year for a total of $52. The creditors 
appoint a liquidator. 
The liquidator's principle ground for recovery in this 
situation is contained in the sections on transactions at an 
over value. The 1955 Act, section 311 C, allows recovery 
from a director of "any amount by which the value of the 
consideration given ... for the services exceeded the value 
thereof at the time of the acquisition thereof" where the 
transaction occurred in the three years preceding winding 
up. The 1993 Act provision60 is substantially the same. 
The difficulty for the creditor lies in proving the salaries m 
the two previous years61 were in fact excessive. Under the 
1955 Act the liquidator is unlikely to find any evidence of 
the couple's justification for the salary but under the 1993 
Act this will be stated on the certificate. However the 
information provided in the certificate is very general in 
nature and of little assistance. 
bankruptcy as the most cost effective means of protecting their 
investment. 
60 Section 298. 
61 Note that a this year has been a bad one the only years for which a 
claim can be made are the two preceding years. 
62 
Later 
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While section 311 C is a civil prov1s10n and the burden 
should be one of balance of probabilities the burden on the 
liquidator is a heavy one. The cases have established that 
the evidential burden lies on the liquidator. The 
ub tantive burden also lies on the liquidator and 1s a hard 
one to meet. An intention to defeat creditors by means of a 
clearly artificial transaction appears to be required before 
the courts will intervene. 62 Given the similar wording of 
the 1993 Act provision it is likely that the same standards 
will apply. Given the strong arguments for the fairness of a 
performance related salary it is improbable the liquidator 
could succeed. 
The 1993 Act provides another ground for the liquidator 
to bring an action under. Section 161 provides that if there 
is no certificate or if there were no reasonable grounds for 
issuing the certificate then the salary can be recovered 
except to the extent the directors prove the salary was fair 
to the company at the time it was provided. The section is 
In Re Burgess Homes (1989) 4 NZCLC 69,914 the Court of Appeal, 
reversing the decision of Tipping J, stated that the court should be 
slow to condemn a bona fide commercial or family bargain negotiated 
at arms length and with no intention of defeating creditors. The court 
suggested that while section 311 C appeared to be wide in scope it was 
aimed at reasonably clear cases of inadequate consideration. The case 
involved two companies, BH and C&G. Mr Burgess senior ("Senior") had 
nominal shareholdings in both and was governing director of BH. BH 
had the bulk of the shares in BH and Mr Burgess junior had the shares 
in BH. As a result of disputes over management the two agreed to 
separate the companies. Senior's one share in C&G was made the only 
voting share and Senior resigned as governing director of BH. Under 
the terms of the agreement the one share would revert to BH on 
Senior's death. 
BH went into liquidation and the liquidator attempted to gain control of 
C&G, the major remaining asset of BH. In court expert evidence was led 
showing the transfer of voting rights involved a transfer of wealth to 
Senior. Tipping J held that the value lost to BH was $70,000 and that no 
material consideration had been given. The Court of Appeal rejected 
both findings. The Court of Appeal considered that while the voting 
rights in C&G were valuable Senior had already possessed these 
indirectly dS governing director of BH and therefore had gained 
nothing from the deal. The Court of Appeal's astonishing failure to 
consider the very real loss of rights to BH, a separate legal entity to 
Burgess junior, is an indication of its reluctance to interfere with 
decisions made in good faith. 
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different to section 298 as it provides a right to the 
company before liquidation and does not have a specific 
time limit. The section appears to be aimed at allowing 
shareholders to recover exce sive salaries paid to 
directors. The liquidator can bring an action under this 
section as all the rights of the company accrue to the 
liquidator. 
This provision improves the liquidator's position if the 
directors have failed to follow the formalities required by 
section 161. The liquidator could bring a claim under 
section 161 (5). The directors would then have the burden 
of proving the employment contract was fair to the 
company at the time it was made. If the liquidator 
succeeds then any excessive salary payments will be 
recoverable. This covers not just in the preceding two 
years but in all five years of the company's operation. In 
this example however it is quite likely the couple could 
show the contract was fair. 
If the formalities were followed the liquidator's position 1s 
only improved to the extent that the three year 
requirement is not present. However the liquidator will 
bear the burden of proving there were not "reasonable 
grounds ... for the opinion set out in the certificate".63 The 
expression used suggests that the liquidator must show the 
decision was groundless. This is a at least as onerous a 
requirement as that under section 298. The directors can 
easily show they did have reasonable grounds for their 
decision. 
Another possible ground available to creditors is the 1993 
Act "substantial risk of loss" provision. 64 This makes the 
directors liable where the business of the company is 
carried on in a manner likely to create a serious risk of 
loss to the company's cr~ditors. The provision could be 
63 Section 161(5). 
64 Section I 35 . 
65 
66 
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used as the basis of a claim that running the business with 
nominal capital and extracting all profits as earned created 
such a risk.65 The action would be for losses due to breach 
of the director's duties to the company but would in effect 
be a means of recovering the distribution. While the 
meaning of section 135 i yet to be tested in court it is 
improbable that a court would find the couple in breach of 
their duties in the first five years when the company was 
operating profitably. 6 6 
Liability under the transaction at over value prov1s10ns 
apply to the couple in their capacity as director/employees 
so their capacity as shareholders is not relevant. As stated 
above the directors appear to be reasonably safe provided 
they have followed the requirements of section 161. 
3 Conclusion on this transaction 
Under the 1993 Act as under the 1955 Act salaries are an 
ideal method of extracting wealth from closely held 
companies. Only distributions in the three years before 
winding up are at risk. These distributions can be 
recovered only if the liquidator can show an intent to 
defeat creditors or other evidence of a lack of good faith. 
The only significant change in the law is the introduction 
of the section 161 certification process. If the required 
formalities are not followed the directors bear the burden 
of proof to show the payments were fair to the company. 
Over the course of time a business will have good years and bad years. 
Normally a company will rely on the equity to survive the bad years in 
the cycle. By extracting all profits the couple could be seen as placing 
all the risk of bad years on the creditors. However the performance 
based salary means there will seldom be years sufficiently bad to 
result in losses to the company. It would be difficult to argue there was 
a substantial risk of serious loss, whatever those terms may mean. 
There is a greater chance a court would find a breach of th;s duty in 
the final year. A reckless trading claim might also succeed rn relation 
to debts incurred close to winding up. However as no salary was paid in 
the loss making period this would be purely an insolvency issue and 
beyond the scope of this paper given the company reckless trading 
provision of each Act. 
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If the required formalities are followed then section 161 
will be of little use to the liquidator. 
C Provision of Goods and Services 
1 Ex ante 
The couple in the example above can extract all profits as 
salary so there does not appear to be any need for them to 
extract profits by means of selling goods or services to the 
company. Suppose however that instead of failing m year 
six the business grows. 0, an old friend of W's is 
approached to join the business as a partner. The three 
agree on a profit sharing formula and carry out the 
necessary formalities to create employment contracts 
which put this into effect. 0 is given one of the two shares 
and a place on the board. However O has few assets and so 
the couple will have to buy a second van for the business. 
As the parties are contributing different amounts of assets 
it is appropriate that some form of leasing of the assets to 
the company occur. By splitting the income related to the 
assets to that due for personal services the couple's greater 
financial contribution is recognised. 
The trio need to decide what the lease payments will be. 
The amount will need to be set more carefully than the 
salary for two reasons. First it will be easier for a 
liquidator to give evidence of the value of the lease. 
Secondly the amount of the lease payments will affect the 
division of income amongst the parties.67 At the start of 
the venture the second reason will be more significant as 
being fair to O will be of greater concern than the remote 
possibility of liquidation. 
6 7 The earnings on which the salaries are based will now be earnings 
before salaries but after lease payments . The higher the lease 
payments the lower the salaries. As O receives salary only lower 
salaries will disadvantage 0 . 
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A lease payment is based on two factors - the loss in value 
of the asset over the period (anticipated depreciation) and 
a return on the investment in the asset ba ed on its 
opening value. If the assets being leased were complex to 
value or expensive an expert opinion could be obtained. 
However the assets are tools and two vans. The trio would 
prefer to take the risk of some slight inaccuracy in the 
lease payments than pay an exorbitant fee to a valuer. 
Establishing the opening value of the assets is easy. The 
econd van is purchased so for $25,000. The trio look at 
the classified advertisements in the newspapers to 
determine that the second hand value of the old van IS 
$7,000. W and O know the value of the tools as they both 
have experience of purchasing these. W's tools have a 
second hand value of $11,000 while O's are worth $9,000. 
The trio therefore decide to leave the tools out of the 
equation as both have similar values. 
The loss m value of the vans over time IS harder to assess 
but the trio agree that the old van probably has another 
three years of service in it and could be sold for $1,000. 
The new van has ten years service in it with a residual 
value of $1,000. The trio agree to use a straight line 
depreciation method giving a depreciation of $4,400 per 
annum. 
Calculating the second component of the lease payments, 
the return on the asset is more complex. The trio agree 
that the rate of return on the investment should be 10%, 
largely for ease of calculation. This figure is more than the 
couple are paying in interest on their mortgage but much 
less than they would pay on financing the vans through a 
finance company. The total lease payment in the first year 
is therefore $7,600 being the $4,400 of depreciation and 
$3,200 of return on the assets opening value of $32,000. 
The trio must now go through the formalities. As in the 
payment of alaries example the Acts do not give any 
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guidance on valuation. The trio's formula thus appears as 
good as any. The 1955 Act requires directors to inform the 
board that they have an interest in a contract the company 
is about to enter into.68 The couple should therefore 
ensure a minute is entered to the minute book to the effect 
the couple are interested in the contract. No other 
formalities are required. The 1993 Act has a similar 
req uiremen t69, with the added formality that the couple 
must also ensure the lease details are entered to the 
interests register. 
The Acts do not contain any requirement to inform 
creditors or gain any external approvals. As noted in the 
previous example the creditors could contract for such 
rights but are unlikely to do so as the transaction costs 
would outweigh the benefits. 
The shareholders have some powers to block interested 
transactions where these were not at fair value 70 but these 
powers will not be exercised here. 
2 Ex poste 
If the company later went into liquidation the liquidator 
would be in a similar situation to that in the previous 
example except that section 161 would not be available. 
The valuation of a lease such as this is easier to dispute 
than a salary agreement as it is easier for the liquidator to 
show objective evidence of value. The liquidator could, for 
example, carry out calculations of the value of the vans, 
their useful Ii ves, residual values and fair rates of return. 
6 8 Section 199. The penalty for failure to disclose is $200 and the failure to 
disclose is a br~ach of the director's duty to the company. In this 
instance the directors are aware of the interest so it is improbable that 
there would be any penalty for failing to disclose. 
69 Section 141. The secti._n requires the disclosure of the interest and also 
that, if possible, the intaest be quantified. Failure to comply exposes 
an offending director to a penalty of up to $10,000. It is unlikely a 
court would impose a penalty in this situation as the directors are in 
fact informed . 
70 Section 141. 
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All this information would be reasonably easy to obtain 
and highly objective . 
Unfortunately for the liquidator while both Acts phrase 
the requirement as an objective test with any surplus 
value retuning to the company the courts have interpreted 
the 1955 Act clause more narrowly . The liquidator must 
show not just that the lease amount was not the ideal lease 
amount but that the lease amount could not have been 
considered a reasonable amount. The agreement of 0, an 
interested third party, to the lease will increase the courts 
reluctance to interfere. 
The lack of a section 161 type certificate showing the 
reasoning behind the valuation of the lease is 
disadvantageous to the liquidator in these circumstances. 
If there were such a certificate the liquidator could attack 
any factor used which appeared unreasonable.? 1 Instead 
the liquidator does not have any way of identifying the 
grounds for the valuation of the lease except going to 
court. 
3 Conclusion on this transaction 
The evidential problem combined with the difficult burden 
of proof and the likelihood that any overpayment element 
in the lease is small makes it the unlikely the liquidator 
would bring an action for recovery of the distribution. 
D Returns of Capital 
Returns of capital are generally associated with public 
companies.72 Our example will therefore be a listed 
7 1 The absence of such a certification requirement is particularly 
surprising given the certificate is much more likely tc be of use to the 
liquidator in these types of transactions where objective and 
quantifiable factors are more relevant than in the remuneration 
context. 
7 2 This is at least in part due to the costly court procedure required to 
reduce capital under the 1955 Act. 
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company with substantial retained earnings. The 
company's directors feel the company has more equity 
than is required for the continued operation of the 
business. The company does not have sufficient imputation 
credits to fully impute the amount they want to return. 
Tax implications therefore support the return of capital 
rather than a distribution of retained earnings. 7 3 
1 The meaning of capital 
Capital has a number of possible meanmgs. Historically the 
courts have based their decisions on the logic flowing from 
a particular definition. A brief canvassing of the 
possibilities is thus appropriate. 
The first type of capital is economic capital. Economic 
capital can be defined as the stock of wealth at a point m 
time. This economic capital can be further divided into 
financial capital and physical capital. The physical capital 
of the company is its ability to produce particular goods or 
services. Financial capital is a broader measure of the 
value of the firms assets measured in either real or 
nominal dollars. Under an economic definition of capital 
income is "the increase in the stock of wealth in the 
current period that can be fully distributed, without 
diminishing wealth". 7 4 
The second type of capital definition is functional. Fixed 
capital is represented by the fixed assets of the entity. 
Fixed assets are those which generate income by use. By 
contrast circulating capital is represented by those assets 
such as trading stock which are regularly purchased and 
sold or consumed as part of the profit making processes of 
the company. Under this definition income is the increase 
in the value of the circulating capital. To the extent that 
73 A return of capital is not taxable income in the shareholders' hands . 
7 4 ME Bradbury, EM Hickey and W Hunt Research Bulletin -119 The New 
Companies Legislation - Accounting Issues (New Zealand Society of 
Accountants, Wellington, I 994), 134. 
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fixed capital assets are sold above or below their book 
value the realised gain or loss are may be treated as 
income. 
Another meaning of capital is contributed capital. 
Contributed capital is the value of the assets (whether cash 
or otherwise) received by the company in exchange for the 
issuing of shares. Contributed capital is usually measured 
in nominal rather than real dollars. Income under this 
approach might be expected to be any increase in the 
nominal financial wealth of the entity. This approach is 
consistent with the notion of contributed capital as a trust 
fund for the creditors. Those creditors in effect rely on the 
existence of this amount of equity in the company as a 
buffer protecting their interest in the company. 
Under the 1955 Act the term nominal capital was used. A 
company's nominal capital was stated in its memorandum 
of association.75 This capital was then broken into the 
number of shares at the par value. Capital could be unpaid, 
partly paid or fully paid.76 Where shares were not fully 
paid the holder was liable to the company for the unpaid 
portion. Shares could be issued at any price above the par 
value. Where shares were issued above par value the 
excess was to be put in a share premium account.77 The 
Act also provided for the accounting treatment of share 
capital and a number of reserves and for a profit and loss 
account to be kept. 7 8 
Section 14(4). 
Section 60 . 
Section 64. The section further specified that "the prov1S1ons of this 
Act relating to the reduction of share capital of a company shall ... 
apply as if the share premium account were paid up share capital .. . ". 
Exceptions to this general rule were that the share premium account 
could be used to pay up unissued shares as bonus shares, to pay up 
partly paid shares or to write off preliminary expenses of the 
company. All these exceptions merely change the classification of 
numbers on the balance sheet rather than creating any distribution 
of the assets of the company. 
These accounting requirements are set out in the Eighth Schedule. 
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As mentioned in the outline the 1955 Act required 
maintenance of this capital. This capital which could not be 
reduced was the nominal capital in the "Ordinary Share 
Capital" and "Share Premium accounts. A distribution 
which resulted in a debit to these accounts was unlawful 
without the approval of the High Court.79 However the 
economic capital was not required to be maintained. The 
nominal capital need not be represented by any assets8 o 
and distributions could occur when there was a debit 
balance in the retained earnings account. 8 1 
2 Ex Ante 
The 1955 Act does not specify any matters which must be 
taken into account by the directors or the court in 
determining when a reduction in share capital may occur. 
Instead the Act sets out a formal procedure which creates 
safeguards for existing creditors. 
The first formality required is the passmg of a special 
resolution8 2 agreeing to the reduction in share capital and 
any related changes to its Articles or Memorandum of 
Association. 83 The shareholders thus both receive notice 
and are able to vote on the reduction. Once the resolution 
is passed the directors apply to the High Court for a 
confirmation order. 84 The court then draws up a list of all 
creditors of the company. If appropriate the court can 
require the publication of notices to allow any creditors 
not on the list to be entered onto it. All the creditors on the 
7 9 See the discussion on reduction of capital at Part III D. 
80 Section 75(l)(b) specifies this situation as one in which a reduction of 
nominal capital might be applied for. 
8 1 This result is not clear from the Act but is well established at common 
law. See below n XX. 
8 2 Section 145(2) states that a special resolution is one passed by at least 
75% of those voting in at a meeting of which 21 days notice must have 
been given. 
83 Section 75. 
84 Section 76 . 
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li t have the power to object to the reduction m share 
capital. 
All creditors are therefore informed and can object. In 
practice the objection procedure does not allow the 
creditor to stop the reduction in share capital. Instead the 
Act provides that where a creditor objects the court may 
direct the company to set aside an amount to meet the 
creditor's claim. 85 All creditors are thus given the 
opportunity to be paid out before the reduction in capital. 
If one assumes the creditors give credit on the basis of the 
capital of the company then this result is sensible.86 The 
court will not give the requested confirmation order until 
all creditors have either been paid, provided for or have 
consented to the reduction. 87 The confirmation order and a 
minute showing the new capital and how it is comprised 
must then be presented to the registrar of companies. 
The rights of the creditors and the funding needs of the 
business are major factors the directors must consider 
before proposing a reduction in share capital. If the 
number of creditors wishing to be paid out exceeds the 
amount available to pay them and the shareholders then 
the reduction will not take place. Major creditors would be 
contacted in advance to ensure they accept the reduction 
as the credit they extend will generally be needed by the 
company. If the company intends to borrow to fund the 
return of capital then the need to consult major creditors 
will be even greater. These creditors will be concerned 
with the level of econcomic equity (capital, reserves and 
retained profit and loss) rather than the nominal capital. 
85 Section 76(2)(c). 
8 6 This logic, with strong roots in principles of contract, was the basis of 
the decision in Flitcroft's Case (1882) 21 Ch D 519 which established the 
rule against reductior, , in capital. At 533-534 Sir George Jessel MR 
stated that a "creditor ... has a right to say that the corporation shall 
keep its capital and not return it to the shareholders, though it may be 
a right which he cannot enforce otherwise than by a winding up 
order." 
8 7 Section 77. 
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Generally the contract with such creditors would require 
the company to maintain certain financial ratios. If these 
would be met after the reduction the creditors would be 
unconcerned by it. 
Minor trade creditors will be less significant as most will 
continue to extend credit terms to the company.8 8 
The other matter the directors must consider is the cost of 
the whole procedure. The High Court process will take 
some time and involve significant legal and administrative 
costs. A reduction in capital under the 1955 Act would 
only be contemplated where there was full support from 
major creditors and the amount to be returned was large 
enough for the tax advantages to justify the transaction 
costs. 
3 Ex Poste 
Suppose the company subsequently is wound up with 
several creditors from the time of the reduction still owed 
money. Given there were substantial retained earnings at 
the time of the reduction of capital it is improbable that 
winding up would occur within a short period of the 
reduction. The example will assume a winding up one year 
later after a catasrpohic event. 
The creditors cannot object after the reduction in share 
capital unless they were not informed of the reduction's 
affect on their claim at the time of the court hearing.89 If 
8 8 These trade creditors' debts are paid regularly so that while the 
amount owing may remain relatively constant that amount will 
comprise different debts at any given time. Any one actual debt will be 
paid in a short period. Such creditors can reduce their exposure to the 
company at any time by ceasing to extend credit on new sales. It makes 
little difference from either their perspective or the company's 
whether they object as any the debts at the time of the . eduction would 
have been paid soon after. If however the creditors cease co extend 
credit the "float" this credit provides will be lost. In practice few trade 
creditors would not extend credit to a listed company whatever its 
nominal capital. 
89 Section 79 . 
35 
the creditor can prove this was the case the court can 
direct shareholders at the date of the reduction to 
contribute funds to pay the creditor's claim. 
In the present circumstance it is unlikely that there would 
be many, if any, such claims available. It is possible some 
small creditors may have been accidentally omitted but 
these creditors would have been paid out during the year 
since the reduction. Long term creditors are usually large 
and would be known to the board of directors. Significant 
claims would be unlikely unless the list of creditors 
presented to the court was fraudulent. The only significant 
claims likely outside of fraud by the directors are those of 
involuntary creditors who had not lodged their claim with 
the courts at the time of the reduction. Since such creditors 
will usually be rare and their claims small relative to the 
assets of the company the shareholders can assume there 
will be no claims on tern subsequent to the reduction. 
The directors and other officers of the company will face a 
penalty of up to three years jail if it is shown they wilfully 
omitted the creditors name from the list provided to the 
court or misrepresented details of the creditor's claim. To 
get a conviction the prosecution would have to prove the 
charge beyond reasonable doubt. Directors who honestly 
approve the reduction are unlikely to suffer any penalties. 
In addition to the possibility of a jail term delinquent 
directors are liable to replace any assets improperly 
transferred to the shareholders. This liability is founded on 
the directors' breach of their duty as quasi trustees of the 
company to protect the company's assets.9 o 
Under the 1993 Act the return of capital is not an issue as 
there is no distinction between capital and other forms of 
equity for the purposes of distributions. 91 The general 
90 This principle was also established in Flitcroft's Case above n XX. 
9 l At the time of writing legislation had been proposed to Parliament 
which would make share repurchases a non taxable return of capital 
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ue of distributions will therefore be considered m the 
next example. 
4 Conclusion on this transaction 
Under the 1993 Act returns of capital occur as part of 
ordinary distributions. Returns of capital under the 1955 
Act required 75% shareholder approval and gave creditors 
an option to be paid out before the reduction. The major 
factors for the directors to consider were the support the 
major creditors would give the reduction and the effect 
this would have on cashflow and the transaction costs and 
tax advantages of this form of distribution. Shareholders 
are unlikely to be exposed to claims resulting from the 
distribution unless there was a fraud perpetrated. 
Directors and any other officers involved in such a fraud 
face a three year prison sentence and liability for any 
distribution not recovered from the shareholders, a 
significant deterrent. 
As in the earlier transactions the major practical difference 
between the position under the 1955 Act and that under 
the 1993 Act is that under the 1993 Act the failure to 
follow the formalities laid down by the Act increases the 
probability of liability. The only other practical change 
would appear to be the elimination of the rules against 
repayment of capital. The elimination of these rules could 
potentially allow a larger dividend to be paid. Unlike in the 
previous transactions the certification requirement 
appears to be more useful to the liquidator as a source of 
information about the directors' decision. 
E Payment of Dividends 
for tax purposes to the extent the contributed capital had not been 
returned previously. The repurchase of shares would then become a 
return of capital from a tax law perspective if not a company law 
perspective . 
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Under the 1955 Act share repurchases were not 
permitted . A comparison of the two Acts might therefore 
suggest that the 1993 Act allows more distributions. 
However dividends and share repurchases are 
economically identical in their effect on the equity of the 
company.92 The only economic differences between the 
two types of distribution derive from the potential of 
share repurchases to be non pro rata and thereby affect 
the relative control interests and economic position of the 
shareholders. For the purposes of this example share 
repurchases and dividends will be treated as identical 
distributions with the 1993 Act merely providing two 
alternative means of achieving the same end. 
Under both the 1955 Act and the 1993 Act a company 
with significant retained earnings is able to pay a 
dividend without any real risk of liability for 
shareholders and directors or any need for approvals. The 
ability to pay a dividend becomes more questionable 
where the company has accumulated trading losses or 
realised and unrealised gains and losses on fixed assets 
In the earlier examples the financial position of the 
company was extremely strong (capital reduction) or 
irrelevant (salaries, leases) in this example the company 
is in between and the financial position of the company 
will be a more significant factor in the ability to make the 
distribution. A detailed examination of the company's 
financial position is required. The law recognises this 
need and both the 1955 Act regime93 and the 1993 Act 
92 Both involve a reduction in the economic capital of the company . See 
the discussion at n 42 below for a discussion of the significance of the 
economic capital. 
93 This principle was clearly established in the case law. For example in 
Ranee's Case (1870) LR 6 Ch 104,122 Sir George Mellish LJ stated " ... a 
declaration of [a dividend] without any profit and loss being made out 
is a mala fide proceeding on the part of the directors ." Where accounts 
have been prepared the court will usually be reluctant to challenge 
those accounts . Where no accounts were prepared the court will place 
the burden of proving the dividend was valid on the directors. 
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regime9 4 require the directors to prepare a set of 
accounts before deciding whether to pay a dividend. 
The example company is a meat processor. The company 
has been in existence for many years and has been listed 
on the stock exchange for the last ten years. The company 
has a paid up capital of $100 M. Unfortunately the 
company has had several bad years in a row and there is 
a $50 M debit in the retained earnings account. At 
balance date there is $1 OM of stock and $30 M of debtors. 
At peak season these figures would be closer to $20 M 
and $60 M respectively. Trade and sundry creditors total 
$45 M ($75 M at peak). Bank overdrafts ($30M) and a 
debenture trust deed ($40 M) provide working capital 
with the banks contributing a further $10 M at peak. The 
fixed assets of the company comprise two plants with a 
book value of $120 M and a feed lot with a historical cost 
of $10 M. Increases in the value of farmland mean the 
feed lot has a market valuation of $30 M. Based on other 
recent sales (eg Fortex) the two plants would probably 
sell for $40 M. In the year just completed the company 
enjoyed a profit of $5 M of which $3 M related to trading 
and $2 M to a gain on sale of a second feedlot. 
The directors have been unable to pay a dividend the last 
three years and would like to pay a dividend to restore 
investor confidence. The directors hope to raise additional 
funds through a rights issue in the next year or so. 
However while the directors want to pay a dividend they 
want to ensure this is done lawfully to avoid any future 
liability to themselves if the company goes into 
liquidation. 
94 The 1993 Act requires. the directors to certify the solvency test has 
been met. One of the things the directors must have regard to when 
forming an opinion as to whether the test is met is the most recent set 
of accounts prepared under the Financial Reporting Act 1993 . These 
accounts could be up to seventeen months old. However the directors 
must also consider other circumstances affecting the company's value 
which would include profits and losses in the period since the last 
accounts. Where the last set of accounts are not up to date this would 
suggest directors should prepare new accounts. 
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I Ex ante under the I 955 Act 
From an economic perspective the capital of the company 
has been eroded by past years' losses. The trust fund 
avaliable to satisfy the creditors has been halved. It 
might be expected that a distribution would be prohibited 
in such a situation but the 1955 Act did not require that 
capital be maintained, merely that it could not be 
distributed back to the shareholders.95 This requirement 
prevented a dividend from being debited to the share 
capital accounts or being debited to the retained earnings 
account where that account was in debit. While a 
dividend would not therefore normally be payable a 
"nimble" dividend might be declarable in these 
circumstances. 
The courts created the nimble dividend by a very literal 
interpretation of the accounting process. Standard 
accounting convention keeps one account, the profit and 
loss account, seperate to the other owners equity accounts 
as a working account during the year. At the close of the 
year the balance of the profit and loss account is normally 
transferred to the Retained Earnings account. If however 
the directors are nimble enough they can declare a 
dividend from the profit and loss account before it is 
transferred to the Retained Earnings account. As no 
accounting entry is made to the capital account the rules 
against return of capital do not apply. Likewise the debit 
balance in the retained earnings account need not be 
considered. 
The directors will therefore be able to pay a dividend if 
the company has a profit in the current year despite the 
95 In Verner v General and Commercial Investment Trust [1894] 2 Ch D 
239, 266 Lindley LJ clarified this issue stating " ... the word profits is by 
no means free from ambiguity. The law is much more accurately 
expressed by saying that dividends cannot be paid out of capital than 
by saying that they can only be paid out of profits". 
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negative retained earnings. Unfortunately determining 
whether there has been a profit is not easy. The 
definitions of income described above all focused on an 
accretion to the opening wealth of the enterprise. 
Income/profit is thus the closing wealth less the opening 
wealth. The difficulty which arises is mea uring opening 
and closing wealth. The example situation demonstrates 
the difficulties involved in measuring wealth. Diagrams 1, 
2 and 3 show possible balance sheets under three 
possible valuation systems. If the opening wealth had 
already been determined the income for the period will 
vary significantly under each valuation system due to the 
changes in Owner's Equity (the net wealth of the 
company). 
Diagram 1 shows clsoing wealth of $55 million. This 
represents a $5 million increase on the previous year. 
Diagram 2 shows wealth of $75 million, a $25 million 
increase. These two balance sheets were prepared on the 
basis that the company is a going concern. The third 
diagram is constructed on a different basis. It is shows 
the wealth if the company went into liquidation. There 1s 
insufficient net wealth to satisfy the claims of all creditors 
with the unsecured creditors suffering a 53% loss and 
shareholders a 100% loss. 
4 1 
Diagram 1: Balance Sheet (historical cost accounting) 
Current Assets Current Liabilites 
(S M ) ( SM ) 
Stoc k I 0 Trade Creditors 45 
De bt o rs 30 Bank 30 
40 75 
Fixed Assets Debenture 40 
Feed lot I 0 Owner's Equity 
Plant 120 
- Capital Contributed 100 
130 Retained Earnings (50) 
Current RE 5 
5 5 
170 170 
Balance Sheet 2 (modified historical cost accounting) 
Current Assets Current Liabilites 
( SM ) ( SM ) 
Stock 1 0 Trade Creditors 45 
Debtors 30 Bank 30 
- -
40 75 
Fixed Assets Debenture 40 
Feedlot 30 Owner's Equity 
Plant 120 
- Capital Contributed 100 
150 Retained Earnings (50) 
Current RE 5 
Revaluation Reserve 20 
-
7 5 
190 190 
Balance Sheet 
Realisable Assets 
Stock 
Debtors 
Feed lot 
Plant 
Total Realisation 
Less :: 
3 
Bank (secured over plant) 
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(liquidation 
l 0 
30 
30 
40 
Trade Creditors (sec ured by Romalpa clauses) 
Debenture (secured by floating charge) 
Total assets after secured creditors paid off 
Unsecured Creditors 
Trade Creditors 
Redundancies 
Shortfall 
45 
20 
values) 
(SM J 
I l 0 
( 3 0) 
( I O) 
( 40) 
30 
(65 ) 
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It is the directors' responsibility to determine the wealth 
of the company.96 If the decision is made honestly and 
reasonably the courts will not interfere. In determining 
whether the decision was honest and reasonable the 
courts have generally looked to accounting practice to see 
whether the practice has any support. The directors 
therefore have some leeway in making their decision but 
should consider accounting practice. 
The liabilities are easy to value. 97 The trade creditors will 
be paid within 14 days and thus any discount would be 
negligible. The Bank charges interest at market rates and 
thus has a value equal to its face value. Redundancies, are 
not treated as a liability unless the directors expect the 
plant to be closed in the near future . 
96 See Ranee's Case, above n 93 . 
97 Liabilities are usually the easiest item to value on the balance sheet as 
they are denominated in dollars and are typically either short term or 
interest bearing at market rates . These features make them easy to 
value in dollars on a balance sheet. Contingent liabilities raise more 
issues as the amount is uncertain and it is difficult to assign a 
probability to each possible outcome. 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
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The assets represent a greater valuation challenge. Both 
accounting and law have historically distinguished 
between fixed assets and circulating assets for the 
purposes of valuation. The distinction is related to the 
fixed and circulating capital distinction discussed above .9 8 
Circulating assets such as stock or debtors are valued at 
the lower of cost or their realisable value.99 These values 
are relatively easy to determine. 
Fixed assets can be valued in several ways. Under 
historical cost accounting fixed assets are valued at cost. 
Where the fixed asset is consumed over time some 
allowance is made for this decrease in value. I oo More 
recently accounting practice has allowed the use of 
modified historical cost. This valuation system allows the 
balance sheet to show the realisable value of fixed assets 
but does not allow increases in the value to be taken to 
the profit and loss account. Instead the credit associated 
with the increase is taken to a special revaluation reserve 
account. Losses must be taken to the profit and loss. 
The directors must determine whether to use historical 
cost or modified cost accounting for each asset. I o I If the 
valuation is to be modified historical cost accounting the 
directors must also decide whether the asset is to be 
valued at realisable value or in use value. 10 2 The existing 
use valuation would be prepared by an independent 
valuer but the directors might be expected to have 
considerable input to the assumptions the valuer used. 
See discussion at part III D 1. 
The realisable value is the price which would be obtained when 
selling them less the costs of the sale . 
This allowance is depreciation if the asset is tangible or amortisation if 
the asset is intangible. 
The liquidation value would only be used if the directors expected the 
company (or its liquidator) to sell the fixed assets in the near future. 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 28 (New Zealand Society of 
Accountants, Wellington, 1991), para 4 .16, states that the existing use 
valuation should be used . Realisable value could only be used where 
the directors intended to sell the asset. 
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In our example the directors decide the existing use 
valuation of the plant would be so subjective as to 
mislead shareholders. However the feedlot does not have 
such a specialised use so the directors decide to use the 
valuation of $30 million they had obtained. While this 
results in a $25 million increase in wealth only the 
realised portion, $5 million, can be recognised in the 
profit and loss. 
$2 million of the $5 million profit relates to a capital gain 
on the sale of the second feedlot. A capital gain may be 
distributed where there has been an accretion to the 
capital of the company. Where there has been a profit m 
the current year but retained earnings are negative it 
may not be possible to distribute a capital profit. No 
commonwealth case 103 has directly decided the issue but 
several cases have intimated that it may not be possible 
to pay a dividend based on capital profits where the net 
value of the company's assets is less than its nominal 
capitaI. 10 4 Given the director's concern to avoid liability in 
103 The writer was unabl to find any evidence of such a case. As a number 
of judges in cse!> reviewed have made obiter comments on the issue it is 
improbable a case with supportive reasoning would not be identified . 
104 For example in Australasian Oil Exploration Ltd (1958) 101 CLR 119, 133 
the Australian High Court stated "This argument asserted that if a 
company ... disposes of a single capital asset at a price in excess of [its 
book value], it may lawfully distribute the casual profit so made ... 
whatever the capital position of the company might otherwise be. This 
proposition was emphatically rejected by Wolff J and we agree with 
him .. . It is enough on this point to say that a company has no profits 
available for dividend purposes unless upon a balance of account it 
appears that there has been an accretion to the paid up capital." 
The case involved a company near insolvency. The company proposed 
the sale of its principle asset at a price sufficent to allow it to pay its 
debts . The asset was believed to be worth substantially more. The 
proposed sale was to a new company to be owned by the same 
shareholders and controlled by the same directors. The purpose was to 
prevent the company having to sell the asset at a firesale price in 
liquidation. The asset was sold above its book value but the plaintiff 
shareholders contended the sale was involved a return of capital as the 
asset comprised the major part of the company's capital and the net 
worth of the company after the sale would be less than the paid up 
capital. While tyhe facts are very different to the present example the 
principle appears to be the same and the New Zealand High Court 
expressed similar sentiments in Hilton, below note XXX 
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the event the company is liquidated it would be 
inadvisable to distribute this $2 million. 
Before deciding whether to distribute the remammg $3 
million the directors must consider several other 
principles of company law established in the cases. The 
first is a requirement that the dividend not cause the 
company to become insolvent in a trading sense. I 05 The 
I 05 The trading insolvency test at common law is similar to that in 
section 4 of the 1993 Act (i.e. will the company be able to pay its 
debts as they fall due after the dividend). The test is set out in Hilton 
International Ltd v Hilton [1989] 1 NZLR 442, 461 per Tipping J. 
Hilton involved a clothing manufacturer which had begun to 
suffer trading losses. By October 1983 it was struggling to pay its 
creditors. It had been regularly in breach of its overdraft limit. By 
late February 1984 the company began to receive section 218 
notices and such notices were soon arriving on a regular basis. At a 
meeting on 1 June 1984 the bank emphasised its concern and 
demanded accounts for the 31 March 1984 year and also the 
contribution of more capital. Mr Hilton had explained the delay to 
the bank as being the result of concerns about tax. He claimed that 
delaying the production of accounts until September would be 
benficial. The bank was unimpressed. 
In July 1984 the company entered into a contract to sell its land and 
buildings to another company and leased them back. This was 
intended to introduce new funds into the company. A capital profit 
was anticipated and the directors intended to use this to pay a 
dividend to themselves to pay off loans from the company to 
themselves. The company showed the bank a preliminary set of 
accounts. This showed a drop in sales of $200,000. This was blamed 
on poor quality merchandise purchased and the company was 
confident it would be awarded damages for loss of goodwill of 
$200,000. The accounts also showed the purchase of two company 
cars - a Daimler and a Rolls Royce. The day after the meeting the 
company had to have a short term increase in its overdraft to avoid 
being wound up. In September cheques were being dishonoured on 
a regular basis. 
On 23 October the company declared a capital dividend of $138,000 
which represented the gain on the sale. No deduction was made for 
estimated tax on the transaction of $77,000. The next day a cheque to 
a major supplier was dishonoured. On 7 November Mr Hilton wrote 
to the bank requested assistance in getting through "the company's 
rather tight liquidity situation. The company continued to decline 
and posted a $150,000 Joss for the year to 31 March 1984. By April 
the Hiltons were discus . ing winding the company up with their 
accountants and lawyers. The conclusion arrived at was that the 
company had been insolvent since August 1984 and that caution 
would be needed in making payments. The company went into 
voluntary liquidation in July 1985. 
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second is that the dividend not cause the company to 
become insolvent in the balance sheet sense. I 06 Finally 
the directors must consider whether the dividend 
jeopardises the solvency of the company in either of the 
foregoing senses. I 07 
The Hiltons had not made any effort to commission accounts before 
paying the dividend. The capital profit was taken in isolation and 
the company's trading losses for the period were not taken into 
account. The amount paid made no allowance for tax on the 
transaction. The Hiltons did not attempt to claim there had been a 
genuine accretion to the company's capital. A retrospectively 
prepared balance sheet (which seriously understated liabilities) 
prepared by the Hilton's accountants showed the company was 
close to having no shareholder's funds after the dividend payment. 
The court mentioned the underestimation but stated it was not 
appropriate to inject the court's judgement. Tipping J also made no 
attempt to write down the assets of the company even though the 
evidence regarding the existence and valuation of those assets was 
tenous. 
The defence argument was principally based on the fact that their 
accountants had not advised them to have accounts prepared. The 
quality of the Hiltons' testimony is indicated by Mr Hilton's 
explanation of the dishonoured cheques. He stated the devaluation 
of the New Zealand dollar in July 1984 had cost the company 
$50,000. When it was pointed out that this did not help his claim he 
was unaware the company was making losses he substantially 
reduced his estimate of the effect of devaluation. 
106 Again the rule is very similar to that in section 4 of the 1993 Act (i .e. 
will the company's assets exceed its liabilities after the dividend). See 
Hilton, above nl05 ,461. 
107 This requirement is based in part at least on an implied duty of care 
owed to creditors by directors where the company is near 
insolvency. The duty would require the directors to consider the 
risks to the creditors if a dividend was paid and to not pay it if they 
considered it created a real risk to the creditors. The existence of 
this duty is uncertain as no case has directly decided the point but 
obiter statements in several judgements have suggested the 
existence of such a duty. The most significant of these cases is 
Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd 1 NZLR [1985] 242. Somers J felt it 
was clear that a distribution by a company which was insolvent 
would be a misapplication of company property. He considered that 
directors "must have regard to the interests of creditors" where the 
company is insolvent but declined to decide whether the same was 
true where the solvency was marginal or doubtful. Richardson J 
expressed his judgement in similar terms. 
Cooke P ch,' se to examine the wider principles involved. He found 
(page 250 of his judgement) "[the] duties of the directors are owed 
to the company. On the facts of a particular case this may require 
the directors to consider inter alia the interests of creditors." Cooke 
P adopted the objective test favoured by the English Court of Appeal 
(per Cumming-Bruce and Templeman LJJ in Re Horsley & Weight 
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In our example the balance sheet insolvency test will be 
met as the balance sheet test is usually based on the 
accounts prepared by the directors. 108 The payment of 
the dividend does not jeopardise this form of solvency. 
Trading insolvency is a more difficult question. The first 
point which should be made is that trading insolvency is 
not impacted by the negative retained earnings. The 
trading solvency issue is different to the balance sheet 
aspect as it is forward looking. The directors should 
Ltd [ 1982] Ch 442, 454-456) "whether at the time of the payment in 
question the directors 'should have appreciated' or 'ought to have 
known' that it was likely to cause loss to creditors or threatened the 
continued existence of the company" He considered an action would 
be available either for misfeasance or based on the statutory duty 
in section 321 of the old Act which covered "any negligence or 
default or breach of duty or trust in relation to the company". 
The case involved a manufacturer which had traded profitably for 
some years then suffered a loss, despite increased sales. Price 
stabilisation regulations prevented the company increasing its 
prices. The company was paying accounts two to three months late 
but the evidence suggested this had been implicitly accepted by the 
suppliers involved. The rapid growth in sales had made existing 
equity and long term financing barely adequate. 
The directors arranged a scheme in which the company's assets 
were sold at a profit to a new company which also purchased the 
shares of the shareholders in Permakraft. The capital profit was 
paid out as a dividend to assist in the financing of the asset 
purchase. The assets were then leased back to the original 
company. The increase in costs to the company allowed it to 
increase its prices 15%. Forecasts prepared by the directors 
suggested this would result in a substantial increase in 
profitability. The plan was presented to the banks and to the Inland 
Revenue Department. It met with approval and was implemented. 
Unfortunately within two years the company had lost several key 
accounts and became insolvent. All creditors at the time of the 
restructuring had been paid soon after and the company had been 
paying debts faster in the months immediately after the 
restructuring than before. 
In Hilton, above n 105, 471-475 Tipping J endorsed Cooke P's 
statements in Pe rmakraft but again the relevant passages do not 
appear to be part of the ratio decidendi of the case. 
108 See Hilton, above n 105, 457-462 for an example of how a court will not 
overturn the directors' assessments unless the directors' assessment 
was groundle . 
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ideally therefore prepare a cashflow forecast to 
determine whether the company can meet its debts as 
they fall due. 109 The projected cashflow from debtor 
collections and creditor payments will be a significant 
part of this cashflow forecast but the key issue will be the 
support of the banks. As noted above the company will 
need to increase its bank borrowings at the peak of the 
season. The key trading solvency issue will therefore be 
whether the banks will continue to support the company. 
The creditors do not have any statutory right to object to 
the payment of a dividend. However the major creditors -
the banks and debenture holders - may have contracted 
for such a right. In this example the banks have a fixed 
security over the land and the plant. The banks major 
concern will be to monitor that the security remains 
adequate. Regular valuations will be the most cost 
effective way to monitor this. The adverse publicity to 
the banks which would result from a mortgagee sale will 
often cause the bank to also monitor the company's 
financial health. The bank facility is an overdraft which 
can be cancelled at any time. This gives the banks a lot of 
~ontrol over the company's actions. The directors will 
need to consult the bank to get approval for the dividend. 
The banks will want to see cashflow projections to 
determine the effect of the dividend on the company's 
borrowing requirements .11 o The banks will probably 
support the dividend payment as it does not endanger 
their secured position and may help entice the 
introduction of new shareholder's funds via the planned 
rights issue. 
109 Preparation of a cashflow forecast is not compulsory. Where a 
dividend was small relative to the size of the company (as it is in our 
example) a court would not usually question the director's judgement 
unless there was clear evidence that the company was struggling to 
pay its debts at the time the dividend was declared. 
110 Note the symmetry between this contractual requirement and the 
common law requirement to meet the trading solvency test. Even rn 
the absence of the contractual requirement the banks must be 
consulted to ensure they will support the company . 
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Unlike the banks the debenture holders have a long term 
funding line in place. This reduces their ability to control 
the company informally . The debenture holders also have 
only a second ranking fixed charge and a floating charge 
over the remainder. The debenture holders ' position is 
much riskier than that of the banks. In order to protect 
themselves they will have created a debenture trust deed 
which requires the company to meet certain criteria at all 
times . Any breach of these criteria will allow the 
debenture holders to appoint a receiver to protect their 
position. 
Unlike the 1955 Act which focuses on nominal capital and 
the prevention of distributions the debenture holders will 
focus on real economic measurements. The debenture 
holders will want to ensure the buffer of equity is always 
sufficient to protect their investment. They will be 
indifferent as to whether the cause of any reduction in 
that buffer is a distribution, trading losses or some other 
cause. The company will be required to maintain the 
buffer not only when a distribution is to occur but 
throughout the year. 
Terms of the debenture m this example include the 
maintenance of a mm1mum ratio of equity : assets of 35% 
measured by the audited financial statements at year 
end. The equity ratio may not fall below 25 % at any point 
during the year. The debenture requires the maintenance 
of at least $60 million of "free" assets at all times. certain 
level of assets without a prior ranking charge on them. I I I 
The debenture also contains a general requirement that 
the directors avoid taking any actions which might 
endanger the debenture holders' position. Unlike many 
debenture trust deeds there is no requirement to 
maintain any liquidity ratios. 
111 Free assets are the assets available as security to the debenture 
holders . This will be calculated by deducting prior ranking securities 
from assets . 
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As the directors have adopted the Diagram 2 balance 
sheet for financial reporting purposes the first calculation 
will be based on thi . The balance sheet shows a 39.5% 
equity ratio. Payment of a $3 million dividend would 
alter this to a 38.5% ratio, well above the required 35%. 
The directors must be careful the minimum ratio of 25% 
is maintained all year however. They will therefore need 
to prepare projected balance sheets. At peak season with 
an additional $40 million of assets employed the ratio 
would be 31.7%, again well above the minimum allowed. 
The free assets total depends on the valuation basis. The 
debenture trust deed requires that a market valuation of 
all fixed assets be obtained for this purpose. Diagram 3 
shows free assets of $70 million, above the required level. 
The general duty to not endanger the debenture holders' 
interests is not breached as the $2 million will have a 
negligible impact on the risk level of the debentures. 
The articles of association provide the shareholders with 
the power to accept or reject the proposed dividend. The 
extra~tion of the $3 million is likely to be appreciated by 
shareholders as it puts cash in their pockets and signals 
confidence on the part of the directors 
The directors would appear to be able to pay a $3 million 
dividend with some confidence. 
2 Ex poste under the 1955 Act 
Suppose the company went into liquidation shortly 
afterwards when spring storms killed lambs and 
intensified competition in the industry. The liquidator 
could recover the dividend from either the shareholders 
(on the basis they had ·received monies not belonging to 
them) or from the directors (for misapplication of 
company funds). To recover the dividend the liquidator 
would have to show that one or more of the legal 
requirements for the payment of dividends were not met. 
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The rules against return of capital would be the first 
consideration. The nimble dividend rule is well 
established so the $3 million could not be claimed on this 
ba IS. 
The liquidator would be unlikely to claim the balance 
sheet solvency test was not met. While a different 
valuation basis might have shown a shortfall (eg Diagram 
3) it is well established that the directors have the power 
to determine the appropriate valuation basis. There is no 
evidence that the directors did not act in good faith when 
making that decision so a court would be unlikely to 
intervene. The concurrence of the auditors in the 
valuation basis strengthens the directors' position. 
Challenging the trading solvency limb is intuitively more 
likely to be successful. The company has become 
insolvent soon after the payment suggesting that it was 
not in fact solvent at the time of the payment. However 
the trading solvency test is forward looking. The dire.cto.rs 
must forecast the future, · a very inexact science. The 
difficulties in making forecasts makes the courts reluctant 
to question such forecasts after the event.112 The 
directors' views are again corroborated by outside 
parties. The auditors signed the accounts on the 
assumption the business was a going concern. The banks 
assumed the business would continue at the time they 
were approached about the dividend. 
If the courts will not interfere in the decisions made 
above it is unlikely that they will interfere based on a 
general duty to creditors. As noted above the duty may 
not exist and if it does its scope is probably limited to 
112 For example in Permakraft, above n 108, 253, Cooke P pointed out "[the] 
directors were entitled to consider the long term position" and 
"[hindsight] can lead to a subconscious applying of too high a 
standard". The judgements of Cooke P and Richardson and Somers JJ 
frequently refer to the good faith and honesty with which the 
directors took the decision as preventing any questioning of the 
directors' findings by the court . 
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increasing the standard of care the directors must meet 
when making distribution decisions. 
If the directors had failed to prepare a balance sheet or 
had not considered issues such as trading solvency then 
the courts would be more able to impose their judgement 
on the facts. Even so the major cause of failure would 
appear to be the weather rather than the dividend and a 
court would be unlikely to impose liability on the 
shareholders or directors. In a large company such as this 
the directors would virtually always have considered 
these issues as part of the process of getting the banks' 
approval and protecting their position under the 
debenture trust deed. 
3 Ex ante under the 1993 Act 
The 1993 Act does not distinguish between nominal 
capital and retained earnings so the issues of nimble 
dividends and of whether a capital profit is payable are 
not relevant. The directors can pay any amount as · a 
dividend so long as the solvency test an<f general 
directors duties are met. In the current example the 
major constraint on the amount of the dividend would be 
the debenture trust deed ratios and the bank's approvals. 
The balance sheet limb of the solvency test under the 
1993 Act requires that "the value of the company's assets 
is greater than the value of its liabilities, including 
contingent liabilities". 113 The "matters requiring . 
consideration" 114 include a requirement to have reference 
to the last set of accounts prepared under the Financial 
Reporting Act 1993 ("the FRA") and to consiaer all other 
circumstances which might affect the value cf the 
company's assets. The last set of accounts prepared under 
the FRA could be up to seventeen months old. Thi! 1993 
113 Section 4( 1 )(b). 
114 Section 4(2) . 
.. .. ~ . . ·'.'. 
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Act might therefore appear to weaken the 1955 Act 
requirement that accounts be drawn up at the time the 
dividend is proposed. However the "other circumstances" 
would include trading gains and losses in the period smce 
the last set of FRA accounts. Preparation of a set of 
accounts at the time the dividend is proposed would still 
appear to be necessary. 
The reference to the FRA accounts 1s a clear indication 
that the directors remain responsible for determining the 
valuations of assets within the bounds of accepted 
accounting practice. The balance sheet solvency test 
under the 1993 Act appears to be identical in operation 
to the 1955 Act test. 
The trading solvency limb is also identical under both 
Acts. The discussion of factors for the directors to 
consider under the 1955 Act applies to the 1993 Act. 
The one significant difference is the introduction of 
certification requirements. The directors must sign a 
certificate stating the solvency test is met and the 
grounds for that opinion. 
These parties rights are not affected by the change in the 
legislation. The restrictions the creditors place on the 
company remam a second hurdle for the directors when 
contemplating a dividend. 
4 Ex paste under the 1993 Act 
Where the directors have signed the required certificate 
the directors' position is at least as strong as under the 
1955 Act. The liquidator must prove not only that the 
company did not meet the solvency test at the time but 
also that the directors did not have any reasonable 
grounds for believing the solvency test was met. The 
liquidator's position is improved at a practical level as the 
certificate will provide the basis of the directors' opinion. 
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This allows the liquidator to examine that basis for any 
flaws and get a better idea of the prospects of success in 
court. In the current example the certificate will refer to 
the balance sheet, the cashflow forecasts, the debenture 
tests and the banks' assurances of continued support. The 
liquidator would be unlikely to attempt an action given 
these facts. 
If the directors do not sign the certificate the pos1t10n 
may be easier for the liquidator. The 1993 Act imposes 
liability where the procedure has not been followed and 
the distribution breached the solvency test. The same 
section 11 5 covers the position where the directors did sign 
the certificate but lacked reasonable grounds for doing so. 
This implies the precondition in subsection 56(1) is an 
objective test of whether the company was solvent. This 
suggests that where the certificate procedure is not 
followed the court should focus on the objective facts 
rather than on whether the directors' had acted in good 
faith on reasonable grounds. The court would then be 
able to impose its own decision rather than merely 
reviewing the directors' decision. The liquidator would be 
able to bring forward independent experts as witnesses 
to show the company did not meet the test whereas if the 
certification process was followed the liquidator could 
only bring forward witnesses if their evidence would 
show the directors' could not have had reasonable 
grounds for their decision. 
This position is similar to the position under the 1955 Act 
where the directors failed to prepare a set of accounts 
and consider the appropriate factors before making the 
distribution. Under the 1955 Act the directors would then 
have to present evidence showing the company was 
solvent after the distribution. However the 1993 Act may 
create greater risk for the directors as if the procedure 
has not been followed the court would appear to be able 
I I 5 Section 56 . 
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to impose its own judgement even if the directors have 
prepared their own set of accounts and considered the 
appropriate matters . Until a case comes before the courts 
it is difficult to predict how willing to interfere the courts 
will be when the directors failure was limited to 
formalities. Historically the courts have been reluctant to 
question the directors' decisions but the new Act may be 
interpreted by the courts as changing their role. 
In the current circumstances a court would probably still 
conclude the solvency test was met but in some instances 
the failure to follow the formalities of the Act could 
significantly harm shareholders and directors. 
If the liquidator is able to prove the dividend was paid in 
breach of the solvency test the position of the directors 
and shareholders is similar to that under the 1955 Act. 
As outlined above the liquidator can recover the dividend 
from the shareholders unless it is unfair to do so and any 
remaining shortfall can be recovered from the directors. 
Where the formalities were not followed the directors 
face an additional risk of a penalty up to $5,000. 
5 Conclusion on this transaction 
As m the earlier transactions the major practical 
difference between the position under the 1955 Act and 
that under the 1993 Act is that under the 1993 Act the 
failure to follow the formalities laid down by the Act 
increases the probability of liability. The only other 
practical change would appear to be the elimination of 
the rules against repayment of capital. The elimination of 
these rules could potentially allow a larger dividend to be 
paid. Unlike in the previous transactions the certification 
requirement appears to be more useful to the liquidator 
as a source of information about the directors' decision. 
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F The Provision of Loans to Shareholders 
1 Ex a11te 
Where a company is owned by another company the 
owning (or holding) company will have control over the 
second (or subsidiary) company and an entitlement to 
any surplus of assets over liabilities in the subsidiary. The 
shareholders of the holding company will usually I 16 be 
indifferent as to whether assets are held or profits are 
made by one company in the group rather than another. 
From an economic perspective the shareholders will treat 
the group as a single investment. 
For creditors however the distinction between the legal 
entities is more significant. If assets or profits are moved 
between companies in a group particular creditors may 
be harmed or benefited as the creditors' claims are 
against particular members of the group. In most 
circumstances the creditor cannot recover the debt from 
other members of the group. 
In some circumstances a creditor may find this legal 
separation a disadvantage but in others it is of 
considerable benefit. While the creditor cannot claim 
debts from other group companies the creditors of those 
companies can also not claim the assets of the debtor 
company. This increases the chances of the creditor being 
paid. 
The group structure thus creates conflicts in the interests 
of different creditors even though both may be creditors 
of the same economic entity. The structure also creates 
conflicts for directors who owe a duty to the company 
I 16 The exception is where a particular company does not have a urplu s 
while others do. The shareholders will then have an incentive to move 
assets and profits from the companies with deficits to those with 
surpluse . 
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whose board they sit on but are appointed by the 
shareholders of the group. 
As noted earlier both Acts regulate the situation where a 
company in a group provides financial assistance to 
hareholders for the purchase of shares in that company. 
In the group of companies the more common movement 
of wealth between companies will be in the form of loans 
or guarantees for other purposes. As noted above the 
giving of financial assistance to a shareholder is not prim a 
facie a distribution. As an example when Trustbank loans 
money to a customer shareholder as a part of its normal 
business no distribution of wealth occurs. Trustbank is 
fully compensated for the loan by the interest payments 
and any collateral provided. Where the loan is within a 
group of companies there is a greater probability that a 
distribution of wealth is occurring. The company is not in 
the business of lending large sums so the transaction will 
be outside the experience of the directors. The directors 
will have some control over the other company and a 
level of knowledge of and confidence in that other 
company that will be higher than that of a third party 
lender. The directors of the provider will therefore often 
set the interest rate and collateral requirements lower 
than a third party lender would. The lower interest rate 
and reduced ( or non existent) security requirements are 
the reason the funds are sought from within the group. 
The informational advantages may justify the lower 
interest rate but it is more likely that the lower rate 
represents a removal of wealth from the company. 
Our example involves H, the holding company and two 
100% owned subsidiaries. The two subsidiaries are H's 
only assets. A is a construction company. The industry 
norm is that at the end of each month the company will 
send the client a certificate stating the percentage 
completion of the project. The client will then pay this 
percentage of the construction fee within seven days. The 
company sub contracts most of its work and pays the sub 
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contractors one month after they have invoiced the 
company. A ten percent retention is deducted from the 
payment to cover any defects of workmanship discovered 
later. The retention is held for six months to a year. The 
result is that the company is receiving money from its 
debtors well before it has to pay its creditors. The sums 
involved are significant and the cash is held in the bank. 
The cash rich nature of the industry has allowed the 
group to keep its equity in A at low levels. Profits have 
been extracted to pay dividends to H's shareholders and 
to invest in B. 
B 1s a property investment and development company. It 
owns a number of parcels of land for the purposes of 
resale or development. Usually A would be the 
construction manager for any developments. Prior to the 
property market slump B was A's biggest customer. Post 
slump B is in financial difficulty. The market has fallen 
dramatically slashing the value of B's property portfolio 
from $120 million to $30 million. Any sales of the 
development property would be at a loss. The company's 
income is insufficient to pay the interest on its 
borrowings. The plummeting market value of B's land has 
caused B 's banks to become concerned. There 1s a 
possibility that a receiver will be appointed. 
The directors of H, A and B are identical. The directors 
believe that the property slump is temporary and that if 
B can avoid selling the properties they will recover in 
value within a few years. The directors decide that the 
solution is to loan A's cash to B. B will use the funds to 
repay the bank debt and will borrow further funds to pay 
the interest on the loan. The directors do not expect that B 
will need to use the cash in the next three years as the 
company has sufficient contracts to keep operations (and 
thus debt to sub contractors) at current levels. The 
directors believe the value of the properties (previously 
$100 million) will have recovered sufficiently in that time 
to allow realisation of some of the property. Hopefully B 
·,~ 
., 
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will also then be able to provide A with development 
work . 
Diagram 4. Intercompany Loan 
A 
( construction 
company) 
100 % 
H 
(holding 
company) 
100 % 
Unsecured Loan 
$50 M 
B 
(property 
investment) 
Diagram 5: Balance Sheet of A (after loan) 
Current 
WIP 
Debtors 
Loan to A 
Assets 
Fixed Assets 
Plant 
( SM ) 
100 
1 5 
50 
-
165 
1 1 
1 1 
1 76 
Current Liabilities 
Sub Contractors 
Sundry Creditors 
Advances from Customers 
Owner's Equity 
Capital Contributed 
Retained Earnings 
(SM ) 
55 
1 0 
105 
-
165 
1 0 
1 1 
176 
60 
Diagram 6: Balance Sheet of B (after loan) 
Current Assets 
Debtors 
Development Property 
( SM ) 
1 
30 
Current Liabilities 
Loan from A 
Sundry Creditors 
( SM ) 
50 
3 1 5 I 
3 1 
Owner's Equity 
Capital Contributed 4 0 
Retained Earnings (60) 
( 2 0) 
3 I 
The transaction 1s clearly beneficial to B. From H's 
perspective the transaction creates a risk that if property 
prices do not recover then the investment in A will be lost. 
However the potential loss ($11 million of equity plus the 
value of A's goodwill) must be weighed against the 
potential gain. Without the loan B is valueless. If the loan 1s 
made there is a strong chance that B will bounce back to 
profitability. If prices rebounded to even half their 
previous levels B would be worth $10 million, virtually 
doubling H's assets. Further developing B 's properties 
might help retain the goodwill in A. The transaction is thus 
a sensible one from the point of view of H. 
It is in their role as directors of A that the directors need 
to be concerned. If property values do not recover before 
A needs the cash then B will become insolvent and 
creditors will suffer a loss of at least $9 million. The failure 
of A may create a risk to clients whose projects were only 
partly completed. If prices do recover then A will receive 
back its money as well as interest calculated at a small 
premium on what it received from th~ bank. A may also 
gain business from B. From A's perspective the risk is high 
and the reward is small. 
Neither Act directly addresses this situation. Only the 
general directors duties impact on the actions of A's 
l l 7 
118 
119 
120 
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directors. Under the 1955 Act the director's duties were 
largely to be found in the case law. Under the 1993 Act 
those duties are mostly stated in the Act. Nonetheless the 
courts will have a significant role in interpreting the scope 
of the duties stated in the 1993 Act. 
Under the 1955 Act the fundamental duty of the directors 
was to act in good faith in the best interests of the 
company. 11 7 This duty is preserved by section 131 of the 
1993 Act. This duty creates a problem in this situation 
however. The directors are nominees, that is they are 
appointed by H and have some responsibility to act in the 
best interests of the shareholders. Under the 1955 Act 
there was some uncertainty as to whether nominee 
directors could take an action not in the best interests of 
the subsidiary merely because it was in the interests of the 
person appointing them. By 1990 the courts appeared to 
have concluded that the nominee directors must act in the 
interests of the subsidiary where there is a conflict.118 The 
1993 Act expressly reverses this ruling by allowing 
nominee directors to act in the best interests of the holding 
company if the constitution so allows. I 19 
The 1955 Act gave the liquidator the right to obtain a 
contribution from the directors where the directors had 
been a party to the contracting of obligations by the 
company without an honest belief on reasonable grounds 
that the company would be able to pay its debts when they 
fell due. 120 The 1993 Act contains a duty to not allow the 
For a discussion of this duty and relevant cases see JF Northey 
Introduction to Company Law in New Zealand (8ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1976), 189-194. 
See A. Beck, A. Borrowdale Guidebook to New Zealand Companies and 
Securities Law (5 ed, CCH, Auckland, 1994), para 313. The Privy 
Council, sitting in right of New Zealand, in Kuwait Asia Bank EC v 
National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 513 rejected earlier 
New Zealand and Australian cases allowing directors to act in the 
interests of the holding company. 
Section 131(1). 
Section 320. 
121 
122 
123 
124 
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incurring of obligations without a belief on reasonable 
grounds that the obligation can be fulfilled. 
As mentioned above several court decision 121 had 
indicated there might be a duty to creditors where the 
company was in or was near insolvency. The 1993 Act 
creates a duty to not allow the business of the company to 
be carried on in a manner likely to create a substantial risk 
of serious loss to the credi tars of the company. 122 
The directors will not want to breach any of these duties as 
the potential liability is substantial. As noted above the 
directors strongly believe the property market will recover 
and that no losses will occur. The directors will want to 
ensure the courts accept that belief was reasonable if the 
market does not recover and a liquidator is appointed. 
Given the significance of the decision the directors should 
take all possible steps to inform themselves before making 
a decision. One such step would be to obtain a 
comprehensive report on the prospects for the property 
market. The report could be prepared by a property 
consultancy or valuer. It may be beneficial to obtain 
reports from more than one source. A report on the 
likelihood that the company will need to use any of the $50 
million for repayment of creditors should also be prepared. 
Assuming all these reports support the directors original 
viewI23 the directors will be in a much better position to 
defend any action 124 for breach of the duty to avoid 
In particular Permakraft, above n 108, and Hilton, above n 105. 
Section 135. J Hodder in Company Law I - Getting Started New Zealand 
(Law Society Seminar Wellington 1994) 48, 52 suggests that this 
provision will be t,eated by the courts as continuing the approach in 
Permakraft, above n I 08. Hodder considers the effect of this would 
appear to be to pr.:!vent the directors from using the creditors funds to 
support speculative transactions. 
Cynics would suggest th?t the reports will be guaranteed to do so if the 
directors make the conclu ~ions they are hoping for clear to the 
"independent" consultants they employ. 
" Section 138 of the I 993 Act explicitly allows the director to rely on 
reports from experts so long as the director has acted in good faith. 
The same position existed under the 1955 Act. 
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creating a substantial risk of serious loss to the creditors or 
of incurring obligations when unable to perform them. It 1s 
more difficult to see how the directors could justify the 
decision as being in the best interests of A. Under the 1993 
Act the directors should ensure the relevant clauses are 
inserted in the constitution to get around this problem. 
The courts have historically been reluctant to interfere in 
directors decisions. The courts have principally avoided 
doing so by the use of two devices. The first is to require 
some evidence of improper purpose 125 or lack of good faith 
before being willing to examine a particular decision of the 
directors. The second has been to set the standard of care 
required of directors at a lower standard. The term gross 
or culpable negligence has been used to distinguish the test 
of a directors' decision from that of "what might be 
described as ordinary or standard negligence" .126 The 1993 
Act explicitly states the standard of carel 27 but it is 
unclear whether this changes the position from that under 
the 1955 Act. 128 
Under the 1993 Act the directors will probably be safe 
from actions by the liquidator if the above steps are taken. 
Their position under the 1955 Act is more tenuous due to 
125 The courts might potentially be more willing to intervene in this 
decision as the directors have a conflict of interest in the decision by 
virtue of their duties to H and B. Where there is evidence of such a 
conflict the courts will be more willing to hear evidence that the 
decision was not made for the proper purposes. 
126 per Gallen J in Grayburn v Laing [1991) 1 NZLR 482, 490. The case was 
one of the Cory Wright Salmond cases. The deputy chairman of the 
failed group was seeking an injunction preventing the liquidator 
bringing an action for breach of his duties as a director. The 
injunction was granted in respect of some claims of the liquidator on 
the basis that the liquidator had failed to present evidence sufficient to 
show gross negligence. Gallen J rejected the liqt:idator's contention 
that section 321 of the 1955 Act referred to ordinary rather than gross 
negligence. 
127 Section 137 states "A director of a company, when exerci .; ing powers or 
performing duties as a director, must exercise the care, di1igence, and 
skill that a reasonable director would exercise in the same 
circumstances ... ". 
128 For a detailed discussion of this question see 0.0 . Jones Company Law in 
New Zealand . 
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the presence of the fundamental duty. While there may be 
some benefits to A in propping up B these are clearly 
outweighed by the risks. Under either Act there is 
sufficient uncertainty that the directors should probably 
also check their insurance policies to ensure this situation 
is covered. 
The creditors do not have a statutory right to object to such 
a loan. The creditors could contract for such a right but this 
is unlikely in this situation. The banks might give 
themselves such a power (either formally or informally by 
making the loan a short term one) but the banks have 
exited the group in exchange for the $50 million cash. The 
sub contractors are unlikely to contract for such rights 
because they are mostly owed small amounts so the 
monitoring costs would outweigh the gains. Further the sub 
contractors are mostly tradespeople to whom such 
information would be meaningless. The clients of A will 
probably assess A's financial standing before contracting 
with A but are unlikely to do so in detail or to impose 
restrictive covenants on A. 
The shareholder is H who benefits from the transaction and 
is represented by the directors of A. H strongly supports 
the making of the loan. 
2 Ex paste 
The creditors of A would appoint a liquidator who would 
then wind up A and seek repayment from B. The 
mortgages over the property would be foreclosed on and 
the property sold. As B has no other assets A's liquidator 
would not bother to seek repayment of the shortfall from 
B. Instead the liquidator would examine the possibility of 
recovering the losses from the directors of A. 
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In order to bring a claim the liquidator must present 
evidence of a breach of a duty. 129 Under the 1955 Act 
duties which may have been breached are the fundamental 
duty, the duty to creditors (if it exists) and the reckless 
trading provision. Under the 1993 Act the breach of the 
fundamental duty is allowed by the constitution but 
breaches of the other two duties are actionable. 
Where a duty of the directors has been breached a tortious 
claim can be brought against the directors for recovery of 
the losses. As noted above it is difficult to assess how the 
court will treat the claim. Courts will usually adopt the 
view of Cooke P in Permakraft that "(those] minded to 
commence trading with and give credit to a limited liability 
company ... must normally take the company as it is when 
they elect to do business with it. Short of fraud they must 
be the guardians of their own interests"l30 and "[there] is 
no good reason for cultivating a paternal concern to protect 
business people perfectly able to look after themselves." 131 
These factors together with the clear evidence that the 
directors had carefully considered the risks and obtained 
expert advice before making their decision will make the 
court reluctant to find the directors in breach of their 
duties. To do so would require the court to substitute its 
own speculation for that of the directors. 
If a court found the directors had breached one or more of 
their duties the directors will be liable either for damages 
in tort for the breach of duty or for a contribution under 
section 320 of the 1955 Act. There are no penalties for 
breach of these duties. The directors face greater risks on 
this transaction than on the others both because the 
transaction is larger than the others and because most 
distributions are recovered from the recipients and the 
director is liable only for the remainder. 
129 Section 320 of the 1955 Act is not stated to be a duty but it has the same 
effect as the duty under section 136 of the 1993 Act. 
130 Above n 108, 250 
1 3 I Above n 108, 250. 
66 
The shareholder cannot be held liable under the 1955 Act. 
However H may have agreed to indemnify the directors of 
A for any damages awarded against them. Under the 1993 
Act the shareholder, H, might be treated a a director and 
therefore liable for any breach found by the court. 
In this example H has no assets other than A and B and so 
it is unlikely the liquidator would seek damages or the 
directors seek indemnification. 
3 Conclusion on this transaction 
The transaction probably imposes a greater risk on 
creditors than the earlier distribution transactions did but 
is not regulated directly by either Act. The fundamental 
duty under the 1955 Act probably would make the 
transaction a breach of the directors duties. Under the 
1993 Act this duty can be avoided. The reckless trading 
provision (cf the trading solvency test) would not appear to 
be breached as the directors can show they reasonably 
believed all obligations could be performed. The 
substantial risk of loss provision and the similar duty to 
creditors under the 1955 Act both present a greater risk 
for the directors. Nonetheless the directors should be able 
to avoid liability by obtaining expert advice before making 
the decision. Unfortunately the non specific nature of the 
duties and the lack of case law 132 on this fact situation 
make it impossible to be certain that the directors will not 
be held liable however. The directors should therefore 
check their insurance policies as a safety measure. 
I 3 2 The lack of case law is at least partly due to the low standard of care 
historically adopted by the courts. As a result there have been few 
cases brought for negligence by directors. Instead cases have usually 
been brought under the rules against oppression of minorities, acting 
for improper purposes etc. as these most instances where the directors 
could be shown to have breached the low duty of care involve one of 
these situations . 
67 
G Conclusions on the Comparisons Between the Two 
Ac1s 
I Subslance 
The 1993 Act does not materially affect either the ability 
of the directors to make distributions or the circumstances 
in which tho e distributions can be recovered. In some 
circumstances the 1993 Act specifically allows 
distributions which would previously have been 
constrained either by the capital maintenance regime or by 
directors' duties (eg returns of capital) however the 
number of methods available mean unblocking these 
routes may be of little practical effect. 
The major difference in practice between the 1955 and 
1993 Acts is the implementation of a scheme of 
certification for some distribution decisions. In some 
instances the certification requirement would provide 
useful information to the liquidator but in others the 
information content is limited. In many circumstances 
where such a requirement would be useful it is absent. 
Where the formalities required by the certification process 
are followed the directors position is largely unchanged. 
Where the formalities are not followed significant liabilities 
can result. The principle effect of the certification regime 
would appear to be to make the use of the company form 
hazardous to persons without the resources to obtain 
professional advice. 
2 Misrepresentation 
The 1993 Act may however deal with another problem 
under the 1955 Act, misrepresentation. The form of the 
capital maintenance regime under the 1955 Act could be 
misleading to unsophisticated parties dealing with the 
company. The man in street typically interprets the 
nominal capital as representing cash assets available as a 
trust fund for creditors. Even more sophi ticated persons 
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who are aware of the double entry book keeping system 
would expect that the nominal capital was represented by 
some assets. This impression can be highly mi leading as 
was shown in the dividend transaction . There was no 
requirement that the capital be maintained so losses can 
reduce the real capital of the business. The record kept at 
the Companies Office showed the nominal capital but not 
the losses incurred. Further assets are measured on a 
historical cost rather than a realisable value basis so that 
even where no losses had been declared there may be 
insufficient assets to cover all debts of the company. The 
nimble dividend concept exacerbated this 
misrepresentation by allowing distributions from the 
company when the capital of the company was impaired. 
The rules regarding capital maintenance were complex and 
not widely understood. The general public perceived the 
rules provided a greater level of protection against 
company failure than the rules actually did. To the extent 
that the rules were complex, convoluted, formalistic and 
misleading their restatement or reform was needed. 
The distribution rules in the Companies Act 1993 are 
certainly easier to follow than those in the 1955 Act. 
Nonetheless the publicity surrounding the solvency test 
and its purported role as a fundamental protection against 
company failure probably means the misrepresentation 
continues. The original proposals for the solvency test 
included a requirement that the assets be measured at 
realisable value for the purposes of the balance sheet limb. 
The dropping of this requirement when passing the Act 
was not heavily publicised adding to the 
misrepresentation. The failure to make it clear to even the 
professional community that the solvency test as enacted 
was merely a restatement of an existing rule exacerbates 
the misrepresentation. As the creditors and investors 
become more familiar with the 1993 Act the 
misrepresentation aspect should be reduced a the 
wording of the test is reasonably clear. 
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IV THE DESIRABILITY OF THE 1993 ACT REGIME 
The comparison of the effects of the two Acts contained in 
Part III suggested that the 1993 Act did little more than 
restate the rules which existed under the 1955 Act and 
implement some formalities as a trap for the unwary. No 
significant substantive changes occurred. The obvious 
question to ask i whether this is a good thing or a bad 
thing. 
When answering this question it should be remembered 
that the company is merely the legal form in which a 
business is run. The actions of the business cannot be 
regulated by company law as this would merely encourage 
businesses to use other legal forms. Thus the company 
statute is not a good place to regulate workers rights or 
environmental issues. A nuclear power plant business will 
have little hesitation in using the special partnership 
regime to avoid any substantive restrictions relating to 
companies. 
Another factor to consider is that the issues being dealt 
with involve only monetary loss rather than physical 
harm. Monetary loss can be as significant or more so than 
physical harm l 33 but the fact that only monetary loss 
involved is important. As all benefits and costs relating to 
the company form are monetary company law is highly 
susceptible to economic analysis. 134 In determining 
whether the results are desirable considerable emphasis 
will be placed on economic analysis. 135 As in all economic 
13 3 As an example most people would prefer losing their little finger to losing their life savings. 
134 There are those who argue that all law is susceptible to economic 
analysis but where the issues are closely related to physical or 
emotional harm the problems involved in converting outcomes to a comparable unit make the analysis of limited practical utility. 
135 This paper does not purport to be a comprehensive coverage of these issues. For a more detailed examination of the economic role of the 
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analysis the goal is to achieve the best balance between 
costs and benefits. 
With the above two points rn mind the analysis of the 
rules in the two Acts can proceed. The two Acts are 
principally enabling statutes in that they provide the legal 
authority for the creation of companies. The distribution 
rules are primarily restrictive rather than enabling. 
Restrictions are created to protect someone or something. 
The first step in analysing whether the restrictions are 
appropriate is to identify who should be protected and 
from what. The alternative regimes available need to be 
examined and the cost and benefits of the protection they 
would provide assessed. Finally the ideal solution can be 
compared to that arrived at under the two Acts. 
A The Need for Protection 
Companies deal with a wide range of parties rn a wide 
range of situations. However as noted above the effects the 
company has on those parties are little different to those 
of a business run in any other form. The only unique 
aspect of the company form is that people who invest in 
the company can limit their exposure to the company to a 
fixed amount. This is known as limited liability. 
One result of limited liability is that the investors face a 
lower level of risk than they would if they invested in a 
partnership or traded as a sole proprietor. However the 
risk of the business run by the company is unaffected by 
the legal form. A business that is searching for oil is 
inherently riskier than a business that provides rental 
accommodation to government departments on long term 
leases. Since the risk inherent in the business is fixed the 
reduction is risk to the shareholders must be compensated 
for by an increase in risk to other parties. Those other 
corporation see FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel The Economic Structure 
of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press , Cambridge, 1991 ). 
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partie fall into two categories: creditors and involuntary 
creditors. The creditors are those who contract with the 
company to provide goods or services with delayed 
payment. Involuntary creditors are those who had not 
intended to become creditors of the company but did so 
due to some misfeasance of the company or its agents. 
In a perfect market the creditors would contract to obtain 
a reward for the risks they had assumed. The higher the 
risk placed on the creditors the higher the return they 
would require. The existence of the limited liability 
company would be irrelevant to the business world as all 
the risks would have to be paid for. In the real world 
creditors and shareholders both face problems, transaction 
costs and monitoring costs. The limited liability form is 
used because it helps resolve those problems. 
Both shareholders and creditors must monitor the 
company to determine the level of risk they face and thus 
the return they will require. Some creditors (eg banks) 
may have greater expertise at monitoring the company. 
Both shareholders and other creditors may then be able to 
reduce their own levels of monitoring. As the shareholders' 
investment is wiped out first the shareholders have a 
markedly greater incentive for monitoring the investment. 
In a listed company the existence of institutional investors 
and parties interested in taking over the enterprise may 
reduce the need for individual shareholders to monitor the 
company's management. The creditors may therefore rely 
on the shareholders' personal incentive to monitor 
performance. 
Both creditors and shareholders will monitor only to the 
extent that they perceive the gains from additional 
monitoring will exceed the costs. Where the monitoring of 
another party serves the purpose other parties may not 
need to monitor. The lower level of monitoring may result 
in some random errors. Both shareholders and creditors 
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can eliminate this random risk by investing 136 in many 
companies. If the economy as a whole continues to grow 
then the periodic losses from failed companies will be 
offset by the profits made on the successful investments. 
The above logic suggest there is a need for at least some 
equity investment in companies as the equity investors 
are able to monitor more efficiently and thereby reduce 
the overall monitoring costs (because they also monitor on 
behalf of creditors) . This explains why businesses are not 
financed solely by debt but does not explain limited 
liability. Another monitoring cost does. 
If it were not for limited liability shareholders would need 
to monitor not only the investment but the other 
shareholders. Because liability would be joint and several 
each shareholders risk would be greatly affected by the 
personal wealth of the others. A poor shareholder would 
not be able to pay its share of any liability imposing that 
liability on the other shareholders. Shares would not be 
alienable because of the risks this would impose on the 
other shareholders. Further shareholders could not 
diversify away risk because new investments would 
increase risk. 
Without these features it would be difficult for businesses 
requiring substantial capital to obtain that capital as the 
larger the enterprise and the more the shareholders the 
greater the risk to each shareholder and the costs of 
monitoring the other shareholders and the business.137 It 
would also be difficult for businesses with a high risk to 
136 The creditor is an investor. While creditors have priority over the 
shareholders on winding up they ,finance the company's assets in 
exchange for a return on their money. 
I 3 7 It may be noted that many of these arguments are not as strong for the 
closely held company. For example clos....Jy held companies do not 
usually represent an attempt at diversification, the alienability of 
shares is limited by contract and shareholders are involved in the 
business day to day - the ultimate in monitoring. The economic and 
social utility of the limited liability company may not be as great in 
closely held companies. 
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obtain finance. In a limited liability world the investor's 
diversification allows the investor to invest in relatively 
risky project on the basis the expected return will on 
average be achieved. 138 Without limited liability the 
investor would have to limit the number of investments 
and would be less willing to invest in risky ones as the risk 
cannot be diversified away. 
The limited liability company thus encourages economic 
activity, allows the development of large enterprises with 
the resources to undertake beneficial research and 
supports the undertaking of risky projects with high 
rewards (eg the development of a cure for cancer). The 
limited liability company is thus of benefit to society. 
Why then do we regulate such a social good? The answer 
lies in transaction costs. While each investor could contract 
to set a risk:reward structure that was fair to them the 
costs of drawing up such contracts might outweigh the 
benefits gained. The creditor may prefer to use a more 
standardised contract. The terms of the standard contract 
will be set based on some conception of the expected risks 
of companies in general. The diversification principal 
stated earlier would then allow the investor to eliminate 
the random risk associated with this standard contract.139 
138 Note that the debt investor achieves the same objective in the same manner - the investment is the total exposure of the creditor to the company. 
13 9 The transaction cost problem is particularly serious for the 
involuntary creditor who may not have even known of the existence of the company before the accident which created the creditor relationship. The only possible ways of controlling this risk are insurance or the imposition of legal rules. Note however eliminating or heavily restricting the limited liability company would not eliminate the placing of risk on creditors. Many individuals declare bankruptcy with significant number of creditors. Often companies will have greater equity than sole proprietorships or partnerships operating in the same filed, providing greater protection for involuntary creditors. Nonetheless the limited liability company poses a particular risk as the incentive of avoiding personal bankruptcy may not be present, particularly if the company is undercapitalised. If it is accepted that the limited liability company offers sufficient social benefits to outweigh the disadvantages then the focus must be on controlling the risk to creditors to keep it within acceptable bounds. 
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Society has an interest in regulating to provide some 
minimum level of protection for creditors in order to 
reduce these transaction and monitoring costs . If a creditor 
can rely on any company as presenting no more than a 
certain amount of risk then the need for individual 
contracts and investigation of all debtors positions can be 
reduced. Where the creditor requires a higher level of 
protection this can be contracted for. The question is at 
what level should the protection be set. The level must not 
be so low as to be of no use to creditors and not so high as 
to impose excessive restrictions on the use of the company 
form. 
The Law Commission noted a clear "... perception rn the 
community that our system of company law [had] been 
unequal to the task of preventing abuse." 140 Abuse has 
two adverse consequences. The first is the unsanctioned 
redistribution of wealth from creditors to owners. The 
second is the loss of confidence in the company as a 
contracting party. The use of Romalpa clauses, personal 
guarantees and related security mechanisms have all 
derived from a distrust of the company as a trading 
partner. The development of these security mechanisms 
inhibits the flexibility of the company form and erodes 
limitation of liability. Such mechanisms also erode the 
transaction cost advantages associated with the company 
form. 141 
Since our goal is to control the risk to creditors we need to 
examine the factors affecting that risk. Where the creditor 
is fully secured the creditors risk is reflected in the risk 
that the value of the collateral will fall or that the security 
is not perfected. Where the creditor is not fully secured 
140 Above n 1, 8. 
141 The increasing prevalence of such mechanisms and others, such as 
credit insurance for farmers sending stock to works, also provide a 
refutation of claims by some that parties cannot not freely contract 
with companies but are forced to accept the terms set. 
, .. 
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the creditors risk will depend on the probability of the 
company having cash to pay the debt or a surplus on 
winding up. All else equal the inherent risk in the business 
will affect the creditors risk. All else equal the likelihood 
of loss to the creditors will be inversely proportional to the 
level of shareholder's equity in the business. The level of 
equity in the business will be determined by the size of 
the business and the amount of equity. A million dollars of 
equity is sufficient to provide ample creditor protection m 
a company running a corner diary but provides a 
meaningless level of creditor protection in a large oil 
exploration company which might spend ten of millions on 
investigating a single prospect. The amount of equity will 
be affected by three things: the amount of equity initially 
contributed, the amount of equity distributed back to 
shareholders and the amount of profits or losses 
experienced during the course of operation. 
Diagram 7. The factors affecting creditor risk 
Prof1 ts ond 
Losses 
Contributions 
D1 str1 but 1 ons to 
The Business 
Diagram 7 above shows the factors affecting creditor risk. 
While factors such as the competency of management will 
be relevant to creditor risk this area is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Our discussion will focus on the net level of 
equity m the business. The clear point which the diagram 
makes is that regulating distributions rather than capital is 
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of little value to creditors. Typically creditors will be 
investing some time after the formation of the company 
The contributed capital will be equal the true capital only 
by chance. 
The reluctance to interfere with real capital requirements 
limits the utility of the protections. The greater willingness 
to regulate distributions no doubt arises from the fact that 
the distribution increases the risk of a creditor after the 
creditor has invested whereas capital introduction occurs 
beforehand. Ex paste regulating dividends seems to 
provide increased creditor protection . In reality 
sophisticated equity investors will get around this problem 
by establishing low levels of equity at the start. This 
allows them freedom to withdraw their funds (contributed 
as debt) more readily. In closely held companies and 
groups of companies the ability to extract wealth under 
the pretext of legitimate exchanges of value (ie. via the 
profit and loss) further erodes the worth of the restrictions 
on distributions. To be purposive the restrictions must be 
placed on the level of equity rather than just 
distributions. 142 
B Options 
The first option m this area is to have no regulation of 
companies at all. While the company form has social 
benefits there are clearly risks associated. The running of a 
company using only debt investors funds would have few 
of the benefits and all of the risks associated with the 
company form. In the absence of principles allowing 
recovery from directors in cases of fraud the company 
would be a social liability. The existence of fraud also 
142 Thus even the California rules which provide substantive restnct1on 
on dividend payments covering not only the quantity of equity but 
also the quality still do not provide significant creditor protection . For 
a detailed discussion of the California rules see T.C. Ackerman and JK 
Sterrett "California's New Approach to Dividends and Reacquisition s of 
Shares " (1976) 23 UCLA Law Rev , 1052. 
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detracts from the contract with the creditor. Some 
regulation of companies 1s required. 
The next option is to rely on the general directors duties. 
Company law inevitably has some general prohibition on 
actions which render the company insolvent or create a 
significant risk of insolvency . 143 Making a distribution or 
running a business with inadequate capital are actions 
affected by that general prohibition. The reliance on these 
general duties would provide a level of creditor protection 
which may be superior to a detailed formula. As with the 
introduction of any detailed legal rule introducing a 
specific test relating to distributions may create more 
opportunities for abuse than it eliminates. 
The major criticism of relying on the general prohibition is 
based on the fact that capital maintenance and particularly 
dividends are unusual transactions for companies because 
they are intended to remove wealth rather than create it. 
Thus the reasonable care standard required before 
entering other transactions may be too low where 
distributions occur. The concern is that in some 
circumstances a board of directors might have reasonable 
grounds to make a run an under capitalised company 
based on forecast profits which never eventuate. The 
creditors would then lose out and no action would be 
available as the directors had met the required duty of 
care. 
While the 1993 Act has the solvency test I 44 in reality the 
standards set by that test are not higher than those set by 
143 In the 1993 Act these prohibitions are contained in sections 135 and 
136. 
144 The solvency test may be included either as part of the intention of making the scheme of the Act clearer. It is more likely however that its inclusion is a historical accident. The original Law Commission draft, see n I above, contained a solvency test which used realisable value as the test for distributions, a higher standard then the general duties . The Law Commission draft also did not include section 136. The subsequent alterations to the Act by the Justice Department show little evidence of an understanding of the scheme of the Act. The 
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the general duties. The trading limb is identical to section 
136 and the balance sheet limb is very similar to the effect 
of section 135. The directors are not liable for any 
distribution if they meet the general directors standard of 
care. Shareholder recovery would be possible under the 
general rules as a receipt of money to which they were not 
entitled. Further for most types of distribution the general 
duties are the only protections in place. Given the 
difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate exchanges 
and distributions it is appropriate that a more general test 
be used. 
Requiring some minimum level of capitalisation has an 
inherent appeal given the traditional model of the 
company, particularly the notion that the equity investor 
mcreases the efficiency of the monitoring of the company, 
and the close relationship between equity and creditor 
rsik. The model operates on the basis that the shareholders 
contribute an amount of money which acts as a buffer in 
the event of losses protecting creditors. The shareholders 
thus take most of the risk and in return receive most of 
the reward. The existence of nominal capital companies 
challenges this assumption in practice. 
There would appear 
companies.145 Two 
statutory minimum 
to be merit in stamping out such 
options are available. The first 1s a 
level of contributed capital. The 
Macarthur Committee recommended a minimum statutory 
capital of $2,000. 146 Such an amount would be completely 
arbitrary. The amount would either be large and thus 
Department probably did not recognise the redundancy of the 
solvency test after the changes. 
145 Nominal capital was to some extent a tax driven phenomena. 
Contributed capital could not be extracted without going to the High 
Court which is a costly procedure. Funds could be introduced as loans 
leaving much the same risk exposure on the shareholders as 
contr:buted capital but allowing funds to be extracted as loan 
repayments rather than as dividends which would be taxed . The 
dividend imputation credit regime has partly resolved these tax issues . 
The proposed ordering rules which would allow repurchased shares to 
be used to extract contributed capital would eliminate the first. 
146 Above n 1, 54. 
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inappropriate for small companies or small and thus of no 
use. Both the Law Commission 14 7 and the Jenkins 
Committee 148 rejected the concept as being of no value.149 
An alternative is to allow the company to set its own 
minimum capitaI. 150 Typical credit application forms 
request the capital of the company and could use the 
capital as part 
worthines . It 
assumption that 
of their judgement of a company's credit 
has been suggested that the creditor's 
the capital is available as a buffer against 
losses is so strong as to create almost an implied term in 
the contract between the creditors and the company that 
the capital contributed to the company will be 
maintained. 151 
The stated minimum capital approach has a number of 
disadvantages however. The amount of capital contributed 
at the formation of a company may not be appropriate 
later in its life. Where a company expands using retained 
earnings over many years the capital may be a negligible 
portion of the shareholder's funds. Creditors typically lend 
against the shareholders funds rather than just the stated 
capital. Alternatively a company which has down sized 
might want to return part of its capital to shareholders. 
The general concept of a statute set minimum capital can 
14 7 Above n 1, 54. 
148 Quoted from the Law Commission Report, above n 1, 54. 
149 The discussion of the benefits of the company form suggested that closely held businesses may not offer the same benefits suggesting some way of debarring such companies is desirable. The problem 
which arises is in setting a meaningful rather than arbitrary level and in the many problems the regime would create for the use of companies as administrative conveniences in large company groups. 
151 While capital maintenance rules v.ere later codified they had their origins in this logic. In Flitcroft's Case (1882) 21 Ch D 519, 533-534 Sir George Jessel MR stated that "The creditor ... gives credit to ... the company on the faith of the representatit,n that the capital shall be applied only for the purposes of the business and he therefore has a right to say that the corporation shall keep its capital and not return it to the shareholders .. ". The 1955 Act thus followed this pattern in part at least. Its major flaw was in failing to require maintenance of that 
capital. 
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thus be seen to be unsound m practice despite its inherent 
appeal. 
A variation on the above concepts is to set the minimum 
capital using a percentage of assets . This approach would 
allow for later variations in the size of the company. The 
approach would also reflect commercial reality.152 Setting 
the level would be difficult. 
A statutory minimum would be inappropriate. As the Law 
Commission noted "what 1s an appropriate minimum 
capital for an enterprise depends upon what it does". I 5 3 
Relevant factors include the difficulty of realisation of the 
assets and the level of risk, the higher each is the higher 
the normal equity percentage. However allowing 
companies to set their own equity buffer could have some 
merit. I 54 Companies could pick low percentages but parties 
dealing with them would know to take appropriate 
precautions. If the company's business changed a new 
percentage could be advertised and creditors could opt to 
cease trading with the company if the new level was 
considered too low _ 15 5 
15 2 Debenture trust deeds almost always contain a requirement that a 
certain equity percentage be maintained. Since companies with 
significant debt are usually subject to a debenture trust deed the self 
set equity buffer already exists in most companies. The debenture will 
often also contain requrements as to the quality of the equity (eg 
equity to be measured on realisable value or tests of company 
liquidity) and contain restrictions on the nature of the business the 
company may undertake . These debenture trust arrangements would 
be ideal proections for creditors. Unfortunately it is difficult for 
statutes to create such arrangements as individual companies require 
tailored agreements . Non~theless some have tried, see the discussion at 
11 142 above. 
153 Above n 1, 54. 
154 In practice this 1s exactly what occurs . The debenture trust deed , an 
important part of company 'inancing, implies ratios appropriate to 
the business . As seen in the C.:ividend transaction these may even 
include seasonal variations. 
155 For a discussion of the basic concept of a percentage equity buffer see 
M Hill "The New Company Law- Auditor v Director" (June 1991 ) New 
Zealand Society of Accountants Journal 54,.55. 
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The concept of a published equity buffer expressed in 
percentage terms may have merit but companies have the 
power to achieve this end already so no legislative 
intervention 1s required. Such intervention could be 
helpful as an educative tool however. 
Having eliminated the buffer option and rejected a no rule 
system the only remaining alternative is maintain capital 
at a minimum level of zero, preferably by the use of basic 
directors duties .. 15 6 This ensures that creditors funds are 
never distributed to the shareholders. The difficulty which 
arises with this option IS determining when the 
shareholder's equity reaches zero. This could be left to 
general directors duties but some system must be adopted 
to allow the directors to confidently make assessments. 
Shareholder's equity is equal to the total assets of the 
company less liabilities. The difficulty arises in valuing 
those assets and liabilities. The accounting profession has 
developed many valuation systems and disputes over 
which are appropriate to a particular situation are 
common. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examme 
such issues m detail but the general thrust IS very 
important. 
The many variations m valuation can be grouped into 
categories or systems. Two of these are prime contenders 
for the role of valuing shareholder wealth available for 
distribution. The first is Realisable value. The second is 
generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP). 
The realisable value system of valuation is based on a 
simple premise. An asset, tangible or intangible, IS worth 
I 56 In situations where the nature of the industry creates a substantial risk of loss for third parties there may be a need to ensure asseb are available to compensate for any such loss. Legislating for that industry to have third party insurance or to provide performance bonds will allow realistic minimum levels to be set. It would also ensure use of other legal forms did not allow the statutory purpose to be avoided . 
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the amount it could be sold for. Generally the valuation 
system is based on a value realisable between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller not influenced by undue 
haste. 157 
GAAP 1s a theoretical line of consensu as to the 
appropriate treatment of accounting issues discernible in 
the amorphous body of accounting practice. In New 
Zealand Statements of Standard Accounting Practice 
(SSAPs) have provided guidance since 1973. More recently 
the enactment of the Financial Reporting Act 1993 ("the 
FRA") has created the Accounting Standards Review Board 
(AS RB). 15 8 The ASRB has the power to create Financial 
Reporting Standards (FRSs). The FRA also gives a definition 
of GAAP which includes following the relevant FRSs and 
where there are none defines GAAP as " ... accounting 
policies that . .. are appropriate in the circumstances . . . and 
have authoritative support within the accounting 
profession in New Zealand." 159 
GAAP is based on several fundamental concepts.160 One is 
that relevance (ie. usefulness) must often be compromised 
in order to achieve reliability. GAAP also mdkes three 
major assumptions about the entity. The first is that the 
entity is a going concern. 161 This has major consequences 
for the valuation of assets. Since it is assumed the 
company will continue indefinitely then unless the 
company proposes to sell the asset the resale value of the 
asset is not relevant. Instead the purchase value is used as 
157 However if the reason for using this valuation system is to ensure th at 
there are funds available to satisfy creditors in the event of a 
liquidation a fire sale value may be more appropriate . Depending on 
the class of asset the value in a fire sale may be <lramatically lower 
than that in a normal sale. 
15 8 Financial Reporting Act, s22. 
15 9 Financial Reporting Act, s3. 
160 See The Statement of Concepts for General Purpose Financial 
Reporting (issued by the Council, New Zealand Society of Accountant , 
1993) for an outline of the central principles on which GAAP is based 
in New Zealand. 
161 Above n 160, para 5.1 
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the most objective and easily verifiable (and thus reliable) 
valuation. The asset is then depreciated (if tangible) or 
amortised (if intangible) over the expected useful life of 
the asset. This is known as historical cost accounting. 
Historical co t accounting achieves an appropriate 
distribution of the cost of the asset over the periods 
revenue is earned from it. The result is a fair profit and 
loss in each period.162 
In determining which valuation system is appropriate our 
goal of ensuring creditor's wealth 1s not transferred 
provides little assistance in deciding the issue. Those who 
favour substantial protection for the creditor might be 
expected to favour the realisable value system. Use of 
realisable value would appear to reduce the risk to 
creditors as after the distribution 1s made the company's 
assets are still sufficient to pay the creditors. This 
protection would not be not absolute however as 
liquidation of comparnes rarely occurs at the time of the 
distribution. In the intervening time period a substantial 
reduction in the value of the enterprise will typically 
occur. 
Even without the issue of the delay the realisable value 
system has a number of major drawbacks. Implementing 
the system is difficult. The writer is unaware of any 
company rn New Zealand already using the system as the 
basis of its accounts. 163 The historical cost system allows 
calculation of the value of an asset based on cost - a known 
attribute. The realisable value system requires a valuation. 
162 Accounting practice in recent years has focussed on giving a true and 
fair view of the profit of the entity. The result has been "that the 
balance sheet has played a secondary role, often being regarded as a 
series of left-over debits and credits. As such, its usefulness as a 
financial statement in its own right has been questioned seriously" J 
Goodwin, "Thp Proposed Framework - Be Aware of its Impact" (April 
1992) New Zea'.and Society of Accountants Journal, 67. 
163 The writer is not alone in this. In his article, above n 55, Michael Hill 
who was Chairman of the Accounting Research and Standards Board at 
the time and thus more likely than most to know stated that he was 
unaware of any company using this basis. 
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A responsible director is likely to require a valuation 
report prepared by a professional, independent valuer, 
particularly if the company has low equity. 
Professional valuations are expensive and may serve to 
put the enterprise into an insolvent position. The number 
of valuations required would be beyond the capacity of 
New Zealand's existing valuation profession. It is unlikely 
that a substantial redirection of New Zealand's human 
resource into the field of valuation would be ocially 
desirable. 
A second objection to valuations is their subjective nature. 
Indeed in many circumstances valuations cannot have a 
meaningful basis. As one commentator put it "there is an 
element of artificiality in attempting to fix asset values [on 
a willing buyer/seller basis] in an over-supplied market, 
where there may be no buyers" 16 4 
There is a further issue. The valuation of individual assets 
on their own ignores the fact that the value of a company 
as a going concern "should, in most cases, add up to more 
than the sum of the individual tangible assets." I 65 To give 
a fair picture intangible assets would need to be included. 
Intangible assets include goodwill and brands. Valuation of 
such assets is even more subjective than that of tangible 
assets. Further brand names and goodwill are very fragile 
assets.166 A move to realisable value based accounts could 
result in a senous overstatement of assets and thus 
equity.167 
164 P Carran, "Companies Bill Trade Off" (February 1991) NZ Business 42, 
43. 
165 Above n 31, 42. 
166 As an example consider the effect of the 1990 toxin scare on the value 
of the Perrier brand. In a single day its value would have been 
slashed. Closer to home Independent Newspapers Ltd included "The 
Auckland Star" brand as an asset in its accounts just before closing 
down the loss making paper. 
I 67 In "What's In a Name: The Brand Controversy" (June 1989) UK 
Chartered Accountant's Journal 32, 33 Emile Woolf gives the example of 
Rank Hovis McDougall which narrowly escaped a takeover by 
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In summary then the realisable value system would be 
expensive to implement, results in asset values that are 
highly subjective and 1s at least as likely to result rn 
greater risk to creditors as it is to reduce that risk. I 6 8 
C Conclusion on Desirability of the 1993 Act Position 
The 1993 Act provide little protection for creditors. 
Indeed it appears to provide no more protection than the 
general directors duties do. However the difficulties in 
maintaining any other regime, including the costs of 
compliance and the ease of avoidance by would be 
misfeasors, make this a sensible option. The only concern 
would appear to be that the Act purports to rather more 
than this. The Solvency test has little real substance and 
applies to few of the common methods of distribution and 
yet it is promoted as a substantial protection for creditors. 
Goodman Fielder Wattie in 1988/89. The company reacted by bringing 
its brand values onto the balance sheet at £678 million, increasing 
assets by 68 percent and changing the gearing ratio from 42 percent 
to an impressive 13 percent. 
16 8 See R Instone "Realised Profits: Unrealised Consequences" (1985) Jnl of 
Bus Law, I 06 for a description of the problems created by the UK's attempts to 
limit distributions to realised profits. These include the implicit rejection in 
realised value accounting of the concept of prudence. 
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